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1 
TRADING UP KYOTO: A PROPOSAL  
TO AMEND THE PROTOCOL, PART I 
Deepa Badrinarayana* 
Abstract: This is the first of two Articles that analyze the dynamic and 
complex relation between international trade law and the Kyoto Protocol. 
These Articles argue that the Kyoto Protocol undermines efforts to nego-
tiate a meaningful climate change treaty, and alternatively, they propose a 
new treaty framework to replace the Protocol. This first Article sets out 
the trade and climate treaty conflict and demonstrates that the problem 
cannot be addressed within the current framework of international trade 
law. Developing nations that are now emerging economies and major 
greenhouse gas emitters are not bound by targeted emissions reduction 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Their exclusion in an era of trade 
liberalization under rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) cre-
ates loss of competition and leakage concerns among developed country 
signatories. These concerns have caused developed nations, such as the 
United States, to reject Kyoto Protocol obligations. Others, notably Cana-
da, Japan, and Russia, have also rejected continued obligations under the 
Protocol. Solutions to these problems conflict with WTO rules, as demon-
strated by efforts by some nations to promote their renewable energy sec-
tor in a manner that also addresses competition concerns. Specifically, 
countries have provided renewable energy subsidies (RES), but condi-
tioned their availability on the use of domestic content. WTO member 
nations have challenged such RES under WTO rules, including specific 
agreements, notably the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). In 
one recent dispute, a WTO Panel ruled that the RES violate WTO law. 
Further, these measures do not qualify for environmental exceptions un-
der WTO law, for both legal and normative reasons. A new climate 
change treaty is needed in 2015 to addresses the loss of competition and 
leakage problems. 
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Introduction 
 In 2011 three major greenhouse gas emitters, Canada, Japan, and 
Russia, rejected the second phase of targeted, time-bound emissions 
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.1 They joined the ranks 
of other major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, notably China and 
United States, which have consistently refused to undertake binding 
emissions reduction obligations. Climate change negotiations to reduce 
these emissions have essentially reached a stalemate.2 
 A key obstacle to achieving consensus is concern about the dispar-
ate and negative economic implications of excluding some major emit-
ters from legally binding emissions reduction obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol.3 For example, the United States has consistently re-
                                                                                                                      
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
Under the Kyoto Protocol at Its Sixteenth Session 6 (2001), available at http://un 
fccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/05XXvywqZ4d [hereinafter COP 16]. 
2 What Doha Did, Economist (Dec. 15 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
international/21568355-no-progress-today-slightly-better-chance-progress-tomorrow-what-
doha-did and http://perma.cc/04WiAfHdm78 (noting that the meeting did not produce 
any concrete decision, with some countries such as Canada, Japan, and Russia withdrawing 
from the Protocol and those committed undertaking modest emissions reduction obliga-
tions). 
3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 3, Annex B, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2302 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force 
Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (imposing emissions reduction obligations on 
Annex I countries only, and excluding large developing nations such as India and China); 
William R. Moomaw, Can the International Treaty System Address Climate Change?, 37 Fletch-
er F. of World Aff., Winter 2013, at 105, 109–10 (noting a continuing lack of progress in 
climate change negotiations based on the outside status of the United States and the polit-
ical conflicts between developed and developing nations); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal 
and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2007) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Of Montreal and Kyoto] (noting that the United States did not ratify the Protocol de-
spite a rapid growth in internal GHG emissions, and that developing nations such as China 
and India are not subject to emissions reduction obligations); Cass R. Sunstein, The World 
vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse 
Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675, 1681–82, 1688 (2008) (noting that the United States 
and China have not agreed to binding emissions reduction obligations, and that it is 
against their domestic self-interest to do so in the future). Although several scholars have 
argued that the economic case for climate change is not an adequate reason for inaction 
by the United States, and might indeed be misguided, the reality remains that the United 
States has refused to take action, and a series of countries have followed it. Compare Eric A. 
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J. 1565, 1576 (2008) (arguing 
that U.S. participation would have greater costs than benefits for the United States, while 
simultaneously not contributing to global emissions reductions absent broader participa-
tion by all emitters), and Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme 
Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 Notre 
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fused to undertake emissions reduction obligations on the grounds that 
it will face a loss of economic competitiveness,4 unless other major 
emitters, such as China, undertake comparable obligations.5 Even 
though the United States has agreed to re-engage in negotiations, its 
position is unlikely to change without emerging economies undertak-
ing comparable emissions reduction obligations.6 
 It is also agreed that treating current major emitters on par with 
past emitters would be inequitable to countries aspiring to develop 
economically.7 Emerging economies continue to cite to their historical-
                                                                                                                      
Dame L. Rev. 1, 21–41 (2008) (noting that the cost to the United States of reducing emis-
sions would be great, and noting potential benefits from a warmer climate), with Jody 
Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 
1539 (2009) (arguing that several spillover effects have been ignored by those estimating 
that the cost of climate action to the United States will be greater than the benefits), and 
Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a 
Complex World, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 377, 397–400 (arguing that the United States has a mor-
al obligation to reduce emissions). 
4 Although the term “competitiveness” has several connotations, it is used here to mean 
loss of market share or market access due to increased costs of regulatory compliance. See 
Joshua Meltzer & Katherine Sierra, Trade and Climate Change, Harv. Int’l Rev. (Dec. 7, 
2011), http://hir.harvard.edu/disease/trade-and-climatechange, available at http://perma. 
cc/0AZAYtzUn7y (defining loss of competitiveness as “loss of market share particularly in 
carbon intensive products such as aluminum, cement, and steel imported from countries not 
facing carbon costs”). 
5 See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S202 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Sen. Inhofe that 
the United States should not bear $300 billion in costs and erode America’s manufacturing 
base, which would travel to developing countries such as China and India), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-01-08/pdf/CREC-2009-01-08-pt1-PgS202.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/MMW6-4UWY; 154 Cong. Rec. S4022 (daily ed. May 12, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Voinovich that the United States should not suffer economically while 
countries such as China and India can continue to emit without consequence), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-05-12/pdf/CREC-2008-05-12-pt1-PgS4022.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/NW5Z-Z8UL. At the latest meeting of the Conference of Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Doha, nei-
ther the United States nor China committed to legally binding emissions obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. See Tim Profeta, Weaker Kyoto Protocol Extended at International Climate 
Negotiations, Nat’l Geographic (Dec. 13, 2012), http://newswatch.nationalgeographic. 
com/2012/12/13/weaker-kyoto-protocol-extended-at-international-climate-negotiations, 
available at http://perma.cc/5ZPT-FYCR (noting that the United States and China contin-
ue to remain outside the Kyoto Protocol). 
6 At the Bali COP meeting to UNFCCC, the United States committed to engage in ne-
gotiations on an international treaty to reduce emissions but refused to accept the princi-
ple of “common but differentiated responsibility” outlined in the Kyoto Protocol. See Bali 
Action Plan ¶ I (2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/ 
pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf and http://perma.cc/ZMQ8-EHQ3; Moomaw, supra note 3, at 109. 
7 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 166, 169, 
170 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The Preamble notes that 
developed countries are responsible for the “largest share of historical and current global 
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ly low emissions as a reason to reject emissions reduction obligations 
comparable to those required of developed nations, demanding in-
stead that developed countries bear the greater share of the economic 
burden.8 This situation has created an economic challenge to negotiat-
ing a meaningful and effective climate change treaty. 
 An effective treaty framework to reduce emissions requires a legal 
solution to this economic puzzle.9 Such a solution hinges on under-
standing and addressing the legal root of the economic problem, which 
has not been addressed in the cost-benefit equation that scholars have 
considered so far.10 The issue is not just that the United States will have 
to bear high costs of climate change mitigation.11 The problem is a 
global economic order shaped by international trade law, particularly 
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its intersection 
with climate change mitigation law and policy.12 
 A combination of trade and climate change rules affects climate 
change mitigation efforts.13 WTO law facilitates the movement of goods 
by lowering tariffs and limiting non-tariff barriers, including unilateral 
environmental measures.14 All major GHG emitting nations are WTO 
                                                                                                                      
[GHG] emissions,” unlike developing countries, whose share is likely to grow as they de-
velop. Article 3(1) states that considering equity and the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibility, developed countries should undertake the bulk of emissions reduc-
tion obligations. Article 3(4) also recognizes that developing countries have a right to 
sustainable development. Id. 
8 See, e.g., Meena Menon, Doha Dithers on Equity, Hindu (Dec. 15, 2012), http:// 
www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/doha-dithers-on-equity/article420 
4040.ece, available at http://perma.cc/PH9S-3CP2 (reporting that both India and China 
continue to support equity-based allocation of responsibility in a future climate change 
agreement). 
9 See Fiona Harvey, Lord Stern: Developing Countries Must Make Deeper Emissions Cuts, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/dec/04/lord-
stern-developing-countries-deeper-emissions-cuts, available at http://perma.cc/T6KX-UWLE. 
10 See supra note 3 (discussion of cost-benefit analysis). 
11 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, at 34. 
12 Noted trade scholar John H. Jackson anticipated such a possible problem during the 
formative years of the WTO negotiations, but the issue was not addressed within WTO law. 
See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227, 1249–50 (1992) (“[T]he situation where the environmental 
degradation is of a type that impacts on the world as a whole . . . is perhaps the trickiest 
area for which to develop appropriate policy.”). WTO law encompasses a central agree-
ment, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and a series of specific 
agreements on trade-related issues. See infra notes 97–112 and accompanying text. 
13 Frank H. Murkowski, The Kyoto Protocol Is Not the Answer to Climate Change, 37 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 345, 358 (2000) (arguing that climate policy to mitigate climate change should 
not be limited to a few countries in an era of global trade liberalization). 
14 See generally John H. Jackson, William J. Davely & Alan O. Sykes, International 
Economic Relations 637–46 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing the conflict between trade and 
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Members.15 Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I signato-
ries to reduce their emissions within a set timetable.16 Not all major 
GHG emitting nations, however, are signatories or Annex I countries.17 
This asymmetry in legal obligations creates economic and loss of com-
petitiveness concerns and affects climate change mitigation efforts in 
several ways. 
 First, Annex I signatories to the Kyoto Protocol cannot impose im-
port restrictions on goods produced with a high carbon footprint be-
cause such restrictions would constitute a unilateral trade barrier con-
trary to WTO rules.18 Thus, if an Annex I signatory transitions to low 
carbon methods to produce goods, it must still allow imports from non-
Annex I countries that were produced using carbon-intensive process-
es. Attempted trade-restrictive measures might not qualify for environ-
mental exceptions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),19 particularly absent an international environmental agree-
ment that limits carbon-intensive production of goods, because WTO 
jurisprudence on applying environmental exceptions applies to prod-
ucts, and not to manufacturing processes.20 
                                                                                                                      
environment); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 7–8 (2006) (discussing 
the significance of WTO rules to international commerce and the challenges relative to 
issues such as environmental protection). 
15 See Members and Observers, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_ 
e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/M8D8-QDKD 
(providing a list of WTO members as of March 2, 2013). 
16 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3(1). Annex I signatories consist of developed 
countries that have accepted primary responsibility for emissions reduction and financial 
support to developing countries, under UNFCCC. See id. Annex B. 
17 See, e.g., Profeta, supra note 5 (noting that the United States and China remain out-
side the Kyoto Protocol). 
18 See infra notes 97–112 and accompanying text. 
19 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_ 
e.htm and http://perma.cc/A74T-B34N. 
20 This issue refers to the process and production method problem (PPM). Because 
WTO rules discipline trade in goods (and services), members can generally impose re-
strictions on products, but generally not on the production method. Even though process-
es may be subject to domestic regulation of WTO Members in some instances where they 
are related to the product, such as food products and sanitary conditions, Members may 
not regulate processes that have no bearing on the product directly and seek an Article XX 
exception thereof. Thus, products that do not directly impact the environment might not 
be subject to unilateral domestic regulation, even though the process of producing such a 
product might have negative environmental consequences. For a nuanced discussion of 
PPMs and the scope of their application under WTO rules, see Steve Charnowitz, The Law 
of Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 59, 
75–83, 103–05 (2002) (discussing specific cases in which WTO jurisprudence on PPMs 
limited members’ ability to take environmental protection measures). See generally Sanford 
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 The Kyoto Protocol does not provide a multilateral mechanism to 
control production methods; instead, it establishes a market mecha-
nism to reduce GHG emissions.21 Moreover, Articles 2(1), 2(3), and 
3(14) of the Protocol, and Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), specifically 
encourage non-trade restrictive measures to mitigate climate change22 
and steer clear of trade sanctions as a solution to reduce emissions.23 
Consequently, domestic manufacturers in Annex I countries may face 
increased production costs due to restrictions on fossil fuel use, where-
as non-Annex I major emitters could produce goods without imposing 
emissions restrictions.24 American businesses and the U.S. Senate cited 
                                                                                                                      
E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental 
PPM-Based Trade Measures, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 383 (2002) (arguing that environmental 
PPM-measures should be adjudicated under a strengthened GATT Article XX). Scholars 
have addressed PPMs and climate policy. See, e.g., Bernd G. Janzen, International Trade Law 
and the Carbon Leakage Problem: Are Unilateral U.S. Import Restrictions the Solution?, 8 Sustain-
able Dev. L. & Pol’y 22, 24–26 (2008) (discussing some EU proposals and the proposed 
American Climate Security Act of 2007, which would impose border control on imports to 
ensure that they complied with legal requirements to reduce GHG emissions, and arguing 
that such a measure might be a PPM that violates WTO rules); Andrew Green & Tracey 
Epps, Is There a Role for Trade Measures in Addressing Climate Change?, 15 U.C. Davis J. Int’l 
L. & Pol’y 1, 8, 12, 21–23 (2008). 
21 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 17. 
22 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 2(1), 2(3), 3(14); UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 2, 3, 
5. Both treaties identify possible conflicts between trade and climate policy and state that 
nations should not use arbitrary and discriminatory trade measures. See José Romero & 
Karine Siegwart, A Survey of Kyoto Tools for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: Speculations on Post-
Kyoto Scenarios, in International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate 
Change 13, 14–15 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2009) (citing to UNFCCC and Kyoto Proto-
col provisions that specifically refer to the relation between trade and climate change). But 
see Robert Howse & Anotonia L. Eliason, Domestic and International Strategies to Address Cli-
mate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal Issues, in International Trade Regulation 
and the Mitigation of Climate Change, supra, 48, 52 (interpreting UNFCCC Article 
3(4)’s restriction against imposing arbitrary and discriminatory trade measures to mean 
that other unilateral trade measures are not prohibited by UNFCCC). 
23 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.5 (“Measures taken to combat climate change, in-
cluding unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”). Scholars have criticized the use 
of trade sanctions as a potential solution to emissions reductions as disruptive. See generally 
Jagdish Bhagwati & Petros C. Mavroidis, Is Trade Sanction Against U.S. Exports for Failure to 
Sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-Legal?, 6 World Trade Rev. 300 (2007) (arguing that it would be 
poor politics for the European Union to impose trade sanctions against the U.S. for failing 
to sign the Kyoto Protocol). 
24 See Ryan Vanden Brink, Competitiveness Border Adjustments in U.S. Climate Change Pro-
posals Violate GATT: Suggestions to Utilize GATT’s Environmental Exceptions, 21 Colo. J. Int’l 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 85, 92–93 (2010) (“[S]ix U.S. industries—petroleum, refining, paper 
and pulp, nonmetallic mineral products, chemicals, and ferrous and nonferrous metals—
face potential competitiveness losses.”). 
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loss-of-competitiveness concerns in advising President Clinton against 
signing the Kyoto Protocol.25 
 Second, lower trade barriers facilitate the overall mobility of busi-
nesses, goods, and services. Theoretically, businesses in Annex I coun-
tries can relocate production activities to non-Annex I countries to es-
cape regulations.26 If an Annex I nation generally bans the use of 
certain goods, including fossil fuels such as coal, affected businesses 
can export the goods to satisfy demand in unregulated markets. For 
example, limits on coal use in Washington State have increased coal 
export from the state to China.27 The result is a leakage28 problem that 
                                                                                                                      
25 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 Cong. Rec. 5, 782 (1997); Bus. Roundtable, The 
Kyoto Protocol: A Gap Analysis 1–2 (1998); see also Letter from Robert N. Burt, Envi-
ronment Task Force Chairman, Business Roundtable, to President William J. Clinton (May 
12, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from Robert N. Burt, Environment Task Force 
Chairman, Business Roundtable, to Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee ( July 8, 1997) (on file with author) (citing loss of competition as an im-
portant concern for American businesses if the United States were to sign the Kyoto Pro-
tocol without emerging economies undertaking similar obligations). 
26 See Julia Reinaud, Int’l Energy Agency, Issues Behind Competitiveness and 
Carbon Leakage 3 (2008), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublic- 
ations/publication/Competitiveness_and_Carbon_Leakage.pdf and http://perma.cc/S62X-
JM7M [hereinafter IEA Carbon Leakage Report] (“[D]ifferences in returns on capital 
associated with unilateral mitigation action provide incentives for firms to relocate capital to 
countries with less stringent climate policies.”); World Bank, World Development Report 
2010: Development and Climate Change 253 (2010) (“[S]ome relocation of energy-
intensive industries may already be happening to countries that do not face caps on their 
greenhouse gas emissions.”); see also 155 Cong. Rec. S202, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. 
Inhofe); 154 Cong. Rec. S4022, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. Voinovich). 
27 See Adam J. Moser, Pragmatism Not Dogmatism: The Inconvenient Need for Border Adjust-
ment Tariffs Based on What Is Known About Climate Change, Trade, and China, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. 
L. 675, 677–78 (2011) (noting that coal consumption is increasing in China and India, and 
that Washington state is setting up a port to export coal to China). Leakage has generally 
been low in the case of the European Union, but over-allocation of carbon allowances has 
diminished the effectiveness of its emissions reduction efforts. Id. at 689; see also Mark Gal-
lucci, Washington Could Boost Coal Exports Despite Green Governor, Bloomberg News (Nov. 
26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012–11–26/washington-could-boost-coal-
exports-despite-green-governor.html, available at http://perma.cc/A85E-GQF5; Mark 
Golden, Reduce Greenhouse Gas by Exporting Coal? Yes, Says Stanford Economist, Stanford Re-
port ( Jan. 15, 2013), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2013/january/coal-asia-environ 
ment-011513.html, available at http://perma.cc/MJJ9-Y8SU (noting the potential export of 
coal to China and arguing that such exports would reduce U.S. emissions, but not consid-
ering the general impact on the climate). 
28 See IEA Carbon Leakage Report, supra note 26, at 3 (defining carbon leakage as 
“the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the country . . . over the 
emission reductions in the sector”). 
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undermines mitigation efforts by facilitating continued supply of 
cheaper fossil fuels globally.29 
 This competition and leakage problem cannot be addressed within 
the parameters of WTO law, and trade law solutions to address such 
problems are difficult to implement.30 Broad trade measures, such as 
imposing border carbon taxes or using the Generalized System of Pref-
erences (GSP) to provide incentives for developing countries to reduce 
their emissions, require uniform application, which creates separate 
challenges.31 
 An alternative solution to address this problem—granting subsi-
dies to promote the use of renewable energy under conditions that 
make such energy competitive with fossil fuels—faces WTO challenges 
that cannot be addressed within the parameters of WTO law.32 Renew-
able energy subsidies (RES) appear desirable from climate mitigation, 
energy diversification, and economic perspectives.33 They can help re-
duce reliance on fossil fuels that accelerate climate change,34 increase 
energy security by promoting energy portfolio diversification to ease 
the burgeoning global demand for energy,35 or even provide global 
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. at 39 (rejecting a conclusion that a carbon cap will result in a 100 percent in-
crease in emissions, but noting that “if full auctioning of CO2 allowances became the gen-
eral rule of allocation, for some of the most carbon-intensive industries such as cement, 
blast-furnace steel and some basic chemicals, carbon leakage could be significant enough 
to warrant [countervailing] policy intervention”); World Bank, supra note 26, at 253 (not-
ing that even though high-income countries are bigger net exporters of energy-intensive 
products, emissions reduction policies could lead to leakage with manufacturers moving to 
low-income countries); Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Con-
cerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 2, 6 (Duke University, Working Paper 
NI WP 07–02, 2007), available at http://goo.gl/1u5mmk and http://perma.cc/V4Z-P8FS 
(noting that in certain sectors, carbon leakage occurs and causes increases in emissions, 
even if some claims might be exaggerated); Vanden Brink, supra note 24, at 92–93; Moser, 
supra note 27, at 678 (noting that leakage can cause industries to shift to countries such as 
China, which are attractive destinations for foreign direct investments, and can undermine 
advancement of cleaner technology). 
30 See infra notes 134–147 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., Vanden Brink, supra note 24, at 97–99, 102–05 (arguing that recently pro-
posed bills that would apply border adjustments in a non-uniform manner violate WTO 
law). These trade measures are discussed in detail in Deepa Badrinarayana, Trading Up 
Kyoto: A Proposal to Amend the Protocol, Part II (forthcoming). 
32 See infra notes 148–241 and accompanying text. 
33See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation 7 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2012). 
34 Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms 
Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 125, 131 (2010) (observing 
the potential for renewable energy to become an important low-carbon energy source by 
2050). 
35 See id. at 171. 
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benefits in the form of cheaper renewable goods on the tab of foreign 
taxpayers.36 
 Government support for renewable energy, however, hinges on 
policies that raise competition problems.37 Some countries have condi-
tioned RES on satisfying additional requirements, such as use of do-
mestic content or export performance, to boost the local economy and 
gain a competition advantage by capturing market share, thereby re-
ducing market access to market players from other countries.38 Such 
conditions are protectionist in nature and contrary to both the general 
objectives and some specific rules of the WTO,39 as illustrated by a se-
ries of disputes that are emerging before the WTO.40 
 Between 2010 and 2013, the Canadian province of Ontario, the 
People’s Republic of China, India, and the European Union (EU) each 
passed laws that provide financial assistance to promote renewable en-
                                                                                                                      
36 Andrew Green & Michael Trebilcock, Enforcing WTO Obligations: What Can We Learn 
from Export Subsidies?, 10 J. Int’l. Econ. L. 653, 660–61, 663 (2007) (noting that export 
subsidies will enable firms to sell at lower prices, thereby increasing trade and enabling 
politicians to provide directed benefits, and arguing that developing countries that cannot 
introduce institutional and policy changes can establish export zones to promote greater 
growth); Alan Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 
J. Legal Analysis 473, 476, 517–18 (2010) (noting that the appropriate response to an 
export subsidy should be a “thank you note to the embassy,” and that considering the ben-
efits and disadvantages of subsidies, prohibition should not be permitted unless overall 
welfare reduction is established). 
37 In the context of requesting the energy budget for the fiscal year 2013, Secretary of 
Energy Steven Chu noted: 
The United States is competing in a global race for the clean energy jobs of 
the future . . . . The choice we face as a nation is simple: do we want clean en-
ergy technologies of tomorrow to be in invented in America by American in-
novators, made by American workers and sold around the world, or do we 
want to concede those jobs to our competitors? We can and must compete for 
those jobs. This budget includes responsible investments in an American 
economy that is built to last. 
What Would the President’s Proposed 2013 Budget Mean to the Energy Department?, Energy.gov, 
(Feb. 14, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/what-would-presidents-proposed-2013-budget-
mean-energy-department, available at http://perma.cc/R6KZ-YJGM. 
38 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
39 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access 
Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 69, 
72 (2001) (arguing that the aim of GATT is to increase market access to exporters by re-
quiring importing countries to change their policies); Kyle Bagwell et al., It’s a Question of 
Market Access, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 56, 59 (2002) (arguing that the aim of GATT is to increase 
market access by negotiating mutually beneficial terms and protecting against unilateral 
government infringement). 
40 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
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ergy.41 The financial assistance in each case, however, is conditional.42 
China’s subsidies to its solar and wind equipment manufacturers are 
conditioned on export performance and domestic content use.43 The 
feed-in tariff laws of Canada, the EU, and India alternatively guarantee 
certain purchase prices to renewable electricity producers only if they 
use domestic content.44 
 These types of conditional assistance, known as prohibited subsi-
dies, can violate Article 3.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM).45 They also violate Article 2.1 read 
in conjunction with paragraph 1(a) of the Agreement on Trade Relat-
ed-Investment Measures (TRIMs),46 and Article III:4 of GATT.47 In-
deed, a posse of WTO member states has filed complaints through the 
WTO dispute settlement process and challenged the legality of these 
subsidies under WTO law.48 
 Each of the four disputes initiated before the WTO—the United 
States against China,49 Japan and the EU against Canada,50 China 
against the EU,51 and the United States against India52—is currently at 
                                                                                                                      
41 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text (discussing China’s laws that resulted 
in the disputes). 
44 See infra notes 221–241 and accompanying text (discussing the three disputes and 
related laws). 
45 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
14 [hereinafter ASCM], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm. 
pdf and http://perma.cc/A4Y9-QSW7; see infra notes 177–200 and accompanying text. 
46 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 
[hereinafter TRIMs Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/18-trims.pdf and http://perma.cc/JE6D-77QD; see infra notes 201–209 and ac-
companying text. 
47 GATT, supra note 19, art. III(4). 
48 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text (discussing the WTO dispute settle-
ment system). 
49 Request for Consultations by the United States, China–Measures Concerning Wind 
Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 ( Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter China–Wind Equipment], availa-
ble at http://goo.gl/2c6d6Q and http://perma.cc/L5NH-93SB. 
50 Panel Report, Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R, 
WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision], available 
at http://goo.gl/xmUtaq and http://perma.cc/RAR6-2JA9. 
51 Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States–Certain 
Measures Concerning the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012) 
[hereinafter EU–Renewable Energy], available at http://goo.gl/W1qLlX and http://perma. 
c/JH7H-GVEX. 
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different stages of dispute resolution. The EU–Renewable Energy and 
India–Solar disputes have not proceeded to the Panel stage as of Janu-
ary 2014.53 The WTO challenge against China was also in the consulta-
tion stage but has become dormant after China withdrew its wind sub-
sidies,54 and the United States has imposed anti-dumping tariffs on 
China’s solar panels, after a finding by the International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) that the Chinese subsidies harmed the United States.55 
The EU has taken steps towards imposing similar tariffs.56 China, how-
ever, has challenged some of the measures under WTO law and was in 
the Panel proceeding stage as of January 2014.57 
 Canada has recently lost its appeal of the WTO Panel decision in 
the Canada–Feed-In Tariff dispute.58 The Panel found that the Ontario 
government’s financial assistance to renewable electricity producers did 
                                                                                                                      
52 Request for Consultations by the United States, India–Certain Measure Relating to So-
lar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/1 [hereinafter India–Solar], available at http:// 
goo.gl/ekmH9A and http://perma.cc/NH9U-48S9. 
53 See id.; EU–Renewable Energy, supra note 51. 
54 China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dis-
pute, Office of the United States Trade Representative ( June 2011), http://www.ustr. 
gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment-
subsidies-challenged, available at http://perma.cc/H8YL-GULY [hereinafter China Ends 
Wind Power Subsidies]. 
55 Jeff Uscher, Chinese Solar Makers Face Punitive Tariffs, Forbes (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benzingainsights/2012/11/09/chinese-solar-panel-makers-
face-punitive-tariffs, available at http://perma.cc/CV66-PZTN; Charles W. Thurston, Break-
ing: ITC Makes Unanimous Decision on Chinese Cells and Modules, Renewable Energy World 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/11/ 
commerce-slams-chinese-cell-modules-with-final-duties, available at http://perma.cc/3K 
GL-SHQR. 
56 See Ethan Bilby, EU to Register Chinese Solar Panels in Move Towards Duties: Sources, Reu-
ters (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-eu-china-solar-
idUSBRE91J15V20130220, available at http://perma.cc/56UU-S3LB (reporting that the 
European Commission has authorized a move to register solar panels as a first step toward 
imposing anti-dumping duties, if an investigation reveals that Chinese solar panels import 
at rates below cost of production because of subsidies). 
57 See United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, World 
Trade Organization (Nov. 26 2012), http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_ 
e/ds437_e.htm, available at http://perma.cc/DB5L-G2F3 (noting that a Panel Report is 
forthcoming); United States–Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products 
from China, World Trade Organization (Dec. 17, 2012), http://wto.org/english/tratop_ 
e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds449_e.htm, available at http://perma.cc/8D5M-NYWC (noting that 
a Panel Report is forthcoming). 
58 See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, ¶ 6.1(b)(v), WT/DS412/AB/R (May 6, 2013); Appellate Body Report, 
Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, ¶ 6.1(a)(vi), WT/DS426/AB/R (May 
6, 2013) [hereinafter Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report], available at http://goo.gl/a4Szot 
and http://perma.cc/X7HN-2PFZ. The AB Report is a consolidation of both cases, DS412 
and DS426. 
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not qualify as a prohibited subsidy under ASCM because it did not con-
fer a “benefit” to electricity producers.59 The Panel nevertheless ruled 
that the domestic content requirement violated the TRIMs, which disal-
low nations from imposing domestic content requirements.60 In effect, 
the Panel’s decision undermines Canada’s effort to promote renewable 
energy while simultaneously boosting the local economy and counter-
acting competition.61 
 At first glance, the ruling in Canada-Feed-In Tariffs appears to pre-
clude an analysis regarding the applicability of ASCM to RES. The deci-
sion, however, hinges on the Panel’s reasoning that a market value can-
not be identified in the electricity sector in Canada to evaluate whether 
the financial contribution confers a benefit.62 As noted by the Appellate 
Body, and as discussed later in this Article, other benchmarks could be 
considered.63 
 Even if ASCM is not triggered, the Panel’s decision regarding the 
applicability of TRIMs can render conditional RES ineffective as a strat-
egy to address competition and leakage problems.64 Absent the protec-
tionist conditions, the RES are unlikely to boost the national econo-
my.65 This concern will be especially acute considering initial reports 
that even without the conditional subsidies, the United States might not 
be in a position to compete with China’s solar and wind equipment 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.328. The Appellate Body 
reversed this portion of the decision without ruling on whether a benefit was conferred 
under ASCM. See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶ 5.246. 
60 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 8.2, 8.6. These findings were 
upheld on appeal. Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶ 6.1(b)(v), WT/ 
DS412/AB/R, and ¶ 6.1(a)(vi), WT/DS426/AB/R. 
61 See Peter R. Murphy, Canada: World Trade Organization Rules Against Ontario’s Feed-In 
Tarriff Program, Mondaq (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/213564/ 
Oil+Gas+Electricity/World+Trade+Organization+Rules+Against+Ontarios+FeedIn+ 
Tariff+Program, available at http://perma.cc/74ZQ-2H73. 
62 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶¶ 5.12–.14. 
63 Id. ¶¶ 5.216–.219. 
64 Jose Etcheverry, Renewable Energy Update from Ontario: Feed-In Tariff 
Yields Strong Market Response 3 (2010), available at http://www.canrea.ca/site/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/fit-update-from-ontario-april-10-2010.pdf and http://perma.cc/ 
P79K-WY6C. 
65 See Manuel Frondel et al., Ruhr-Universität Bochum Dep’t of Econ., Eco-
nomic Impacts from the Promotion of Renewable Energy Technologies: The Ger-
man Experience 20 (2009), available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29912/ 
1/614062047.pdf and http://perma.cc/YG6W-NBH7 (arguing that Germany’s subsidiza-
tion of the renewable energy industry has failed to provide sufficient environmental and 
economic rewards and that other countries should reconsider subsidizing clean technolo-
gies that are not competitive in the marketplace on their own merits). 
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manufacturers.66 Thus, WTO rules render conditional RES an inade-
quate solution to address the economic challenges to climate change 
mitigation.67 
 Scholars have proposed at least two possible solutions to this legal 
problem arising from the intersection between trade rules and RES.68 
One option is to encourage countries to provide matching subsidies to 
catalyze the renewable energy industry.69 The other option is to carve 
out an environmental exception to the prohibited subsidies under 
GATT.70 Both proposals have significant merits but are inadequate solu-
tions. 
 Granting matching subsidies, or starting a subsidy “war,” could in-
deed catalyze renewable energy expansion and promote the goals of 
climate change mitigation and energy diversification.71 Subsidies re-
duce the cost of producing renewable energy equipment, lower the re-
tail cost of these goods, and make them affordable on a larger scale, 
even if at the cost of taxpayers.72 Such reductions in cost could 
jumpstart the transition to renewable sources of energy that reduce 
carbon emissions. Similarly, purchase price guarantees under a feed-in 
tariff program can encourage investments in renewable energy produc-
tion.73 Such benefits have even led some scholars to criticize ASCM as 
an inadequate tool in distinguishing distorting subsidies from benefi-
                                                                                                                      
66 See Diane Cardwell, Solar Tariffs Upheld, but May Not Help in U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 
2012, at B1 (reporting that due to supply chain strategies and market share, the U.S. solar 
industry might be unable to compete in the market). 
67 See Ahrunabha Ghosh & Himani Gangania, Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustaina-
ble Dev., Governing Clean Energy Subsidies: What, When, and How Legal? 40–42 
(2012), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/09/governing-clean-energy-subsidies- 
what-why-and-how-legal.pdf and http://perma.cc/7Q2F-DXJ3. 
68 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, Economist’s Voice, July 
2006, at 2; Ingrid Jegou & Luca Rubini, ICTSD Programme on Competitiveness and 
Sustainable Development, The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of 
Charge: Legal and Economic Considerations 47 (2011) (“[T]here are no decisive 
legal obstacles to the application of GATT Article XX to climate change subsidies . . . this 
move may be policy-wise desirable.”). 
69 See Stiglitz, supra note 68, at 2. 
70 See Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 38–47. 
71 David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of 
Solar Industry Production, 41 U. Tol. L. Rev. 943, 944–45 (2010). 
72 See Green & Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 660–61 (supporting export subsidies but 
criticizing expenses to taxpayers). 
73 See Canada–Feed-In-Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.110 (noting several exam-
ples of how Canada’s FIT program has spurred suppliers to invest in renewable energy 
technology). See generally Grinlinton & Paddock, supra note 71 (discussing the role of feed-
in tariffs in promoting investments in renewable energy technology). 
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cial subsidies,74 as well as an obstacle to delivering trade, economic, and 
political benefits.75 
 A tacit agreement to ignore prohibited subsidies, however, is an 
insufficient solution in this instance. Ignoring ASCM rules that directly 
prohibit subsidies conditioned on domestic use or export performance 
compromises two fundamental objectives of WTO agreements: increas-
ing market access and reducing protectionism.76 Some countries do not 
have the financial capacity to subsidize renewable energy equipment or 
renewable energy production, but they might be able to compete in the 
market if other countries do not provide prohibited subsidies.77 Only a 
select number of countries are in a position to provide market-capturing 
subsidies if ASCM violations remain unchallenged.78 
 Furthermore, allowing subsidies is just one part of the problem. 
Ignoring conditional subsidies would violate other WTO rules, includ-
ing TRIMs, as well as fundamental principles of GATT, such as national 
treatment, and thus would seriously undermine well-established inter-
national trade law.79 Exceptions might apply, but they should be justifi-
able and available within the legal framework. As discussed below, a 
case for carving out exceptions to WTO rules is difficult to sustain.80 
 The second solution, applying GATT environmental exceptions, is 
also inadequate and might even be normatively unjustifiable.81 On the 
surface, GATT Article XX, which recognizes certain general exceptions 
to WTO rules, would seem to apply to conditional RES subsidies.82 Ar-
ticle XX(b) has measures to protect non-renewable natural resources, 
and Article XX(g) has measures to protect human, plant, and animal 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Sykes, supra note 36, at 473–74, 506–11(discussing problems with determining 
whether a subsidy violates the agreement and specifically criticizing current WTO law on 
subsidies). 
75 See id. at 476, 517–18 (explaining that export subsidies create trade diversion, in-
crease trade barriers, and jeopardize market access agreements). 
76 See GATT, supra note 19, Preamble. For a discussion of prohibited subsidies, see infra 
notes 177–209 and accompanying text. 
77 See Arvind Panagariya, World Bank, Evaluating the Case for Export Subsi-
dies 3 (2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629126 
and http://perma.cc/YXP2-P65B (arguing that small developing countries in particular 
might not be in a position to provide counter-subsidies). 
78 See Ghosh & Gangania, supra note 67, at 28 (providing examples of six large coun-
tries that have benefitted from subsidy policies). 
79 The need for trade liberalization is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. 
80 Infra notes 243–294 and accompanying text. 
81 Infra notes 295–402 and accompanying text. 
82 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX; Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 47 (“[T]here are 
no decisive legal obstacles to the application of GATT Article XX to climate change subsi-
dies . . . this move may be policy-wise desirable.”). 
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health.83 Arguably, climate change, which is characterized as the great-
est environmental challenge of this century, should qualify for these 
environmental exceptions.84 The fact that Parties in these disputes have 
not invoked environmental exceptions, nor denied the role of renewa-
ble energy in climate change mitigation, signals a reluctance to dispute 
the environmental benefits of RES. Considering the Panel’s decision in 
Canada-Feed-In-Tariffs, however, it is likely that respondents to RES dis-
putes will begin to invoke Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions. If coun-
tries were to take this position, as suggested by some scholars, the issue 
is whether the conditions that are challenged—export performance 
and domestic content use—can be excused under Article XX(b) and 
(g).85 This Article argues, however, that Article XX exceptions cannot 
be applied to conditional RES, for several reasons. 
 First, ASCM, which disciplines prohibited subsidies, provides spe-
cific environmental exceptions to those rules. These specific exceptions 
are different from Article XX general exceptions. Moreover, they have 
expired. The exceptions were specifically and explicitly granted for a 
limited time, and intentionally limited in their scope and validity. Ap-
plying the general exceptions under GATT Article XX runs contrary, 
and without precedent, to the established scope of ASCM, the GATT 
General Interpretation clause, and Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties. These rules generally provide that rules un-
der a specific agreement prevail over rules in a general treaty.86 
 Second, even assuming that general exceptions could apply to spe-
cific agreements such as ASCM, as indeed they apply to TRIMs,87 the 
legal requirements for invoking Article XX(b) and (g) are not satisfied. 
While renewable energy laws and policies can be construed as envi-
ronmental measures to the extent that they promote climate mitigation 
efforts, conditional subsidies do not satisfy the requirements to apply 
the exceptions.88 Article XX, including the chapeau, cannot be invoked 
to allow arbitrary and unjustified measures that are disguised trade re-
strictions.89 The conditions attached to the subsidies are arbitrary and 
                                                                                                                      
83 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX. 
84 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153 (2009) (discussing the multiple 
layers of complexities, ranging from science to law and policy challenges, that climate 
change presents). 
85 See, e.g., Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 47. 
86 See infra notes 297–317 and accompanying text. 
87 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 3. 
88 Infra notes 318–402 and accompanying text. 
89 Infra notes 386–402 and accompanying text. 
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unjustified because they impose protectionist conditions in violation of 
WTO rules even though alternative means exist to achieve the goals of 
climate change mitigation, such as providing unconditional subsidies.90 
 Third, the normative basis for applying Article XX and ASCM ju-
risprudence to RES disputes is tenuous. Generally, scholars have argued 
that the fact that nations have a sovereign prerogative to pursue legiti-
mate environmental protection goals is a reason for applying Article 
XX environmental exceptions to trade-restrictive environmental 
measures.91 This argument fails in the case of the RES disputes. None 
of the four disputed subsidies appear to be motivated solely by legiti-
mate environmental protection concerns—instead they appear to be at 
least partially motivated by protectionist goals to counteract competi-
tion concerns. Notably, Canada, China, and India have refused to ac-
cept binding emissions reduction treaty obligations, even though they 
are among the major emitters of climate change-causing GHGs. Cana-
da recently refused to commit to a second phase of emissions reduction 
goals under the Kyoto Protocol.92 Within the current legal framework, 
Ontario’s commitment to climate change mitigation cannot serve as a 
reason to excuse Canada, as a WTO member, to violate international 
trade rules.93 While the EU is steadfastly committed to the Kyoto Proto-
col, its feed-in tariff laws also appear to be motivated by competition 
concerns rather than purely climate mitigation interests.94 
 In conclusion, arguments to either disregard ASCM or allow RES 
through the operation of GATT Article XX are both inadequate solu-
                                                                                                                      
90 Infra notes 328–338 and accompanying text. 
91 See, e.g., Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 
31 Int’l Law. 697, 704–05 (2003) (noting that the United States has surrendered some 
degree of sovereignty on environmental issues by agreeing to abide by the WTO dispute 
process); Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sover-
eignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295, 296 (2000) 
(arguing that America’s loss of sovereignty under the WTO rules has slowed progress on 
environmental protection). See generally William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization 
and United States’ Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 Am. U. Int’l 
L. Rev 1225 (1998) (setting out the various sovereignty-based arguments against the 
WTO); see also Jackson, supra note 12, at 1249 (noting that states should have a sovereign 
right to decide their own environmental policies, though in a context of allowing states a 
prerogative to choose trade over environmental protection). 
92 Ian Austen, Canada Announces Exit from Kyoto Climate Treaty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 
2011, at A15. 
93 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶ 6.1(b)(v), WT/DS412/AB/R, 
¶ 6.1(a)(vi), WT/DS426/AB/R (holding that Canada’s conditional RES subsidies violated 
GATT and TRIM). 
94 Infra notes 366–376 and accompanying text. 
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tions to redress trade law challenges to RES.95 As such, the specific and 
narrow case of conditional subsidies demonstrates that a solution to the 
conflict between climate change mitigation efforts and competition 
caused by the operation of WTO rules cannot be resolved within the 
parameters of WTO law.96 The need of the hour is a robust climate 
treaty that is designed to mitigate economic concerns within its frame-
work to reduce GHG emissions and that serves as an exception, to the 
extent necessary, to the operation of international trade rules. 
 This Article analyzes the climate-competition puzzle and presents 
the above arguments in four additional parts. Part I lays out the legal 
background and the intersection between WTO law and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Part II discusses the challenges arising from the intersection be-
tween trade and climate change treaties, including the limits of some 
proposals to address the problem by reforming international trade law. 
Part III analyzes the nexus between RES, climate mitigation action, and 
WTO law. Part IV explains the WTO disputes regarding conditional 
RES and argues that Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions cannot apply to 
ASCM and may not be invoked in the case of conditional subsidies that 
are aimed primarily at mitigating competition concerns, for legal and 
normative reasons. Through this analysis, this Article sets the founda-
tion for the second installment of this Article, namely a proposal for 
the design of a new climate treaty. 
I. Legal Background to the Trade, Climate Change and 
Competition Challenge 
 This part sets out the basic scheme of WTO law and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and explains how international trade rules interact and conflict 
with climate change rules to create competition and leakage problems. 
A. The World Trade Organization and Its Laws in Brief 
 The WTO was established in 1994 to administer the multilateral 
trading system and is comprised of agreements governing trade in 
goods and services.97 WTO Member states are required to ratify all the 
                                                                                                                      
95 See infra notes 242–402 and accompanying text. 
96 See generally Bradly J. Condon, Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12(4) 
J. of Int’l Econ. L. 895, available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/4/895. 
full.pdf and http://perma.cc/3MQZ-53QM (noting unresolved issues in WTO law regard-
ing climate change). 
97 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm 
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agreements within the multilateral trading system.98 The foundational 
agreement on trade is GATT.99 GATT sets out fundamental principles 
to reduce discriminatory barriers to free trade and to liberalize trade in 
goods and services, notably most-favored nation (MFN) and national 
treatment, set out in Articles I and III, respectively. 
 Article III requires all Member states to treat imports from other 
Member nations on par with “like” domestic goods. Any advantage or 
benefit conferred to domestic goods should also be offered to im-
ports.100 Article I requires Member states to extend any favorable 
treatment that is given to products originating in or destined for one 
country to “like products” originating in or destined for all other 
Members.101 Only a limited number of exceptions are permitted for 
developing countries, and only under certain conditions.102 
 In addition to GATT, several specific agreements on various trade-
related issues govern Member states. The specific agreements relevant 
to this Article include the TRIMs and ASCM.103 These agreements aim 
to reduce protectionist barriers to free trade. The general and specific 
agreements operate together to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade.104 
 WTO agreements recognize a few exceptions to the rules.105 A no-
table example is Article XX of GATT, which recognizes environmental 
and public health exceptions, among others.106 As discussed below, 
these exceptions are limited in application and are subject to the core 
GATT principles—MFN and national treatment.107 
                                                                                                                      
and http://perma.cc/9826-U5ES. See generally John H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the history of the establishment of WTO rules). See 
John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 17, 
21–23 (1996) [hereinafter Jackson, Reflections] for a discussion on the establishment of the 
WTO. 
98 See Jackson, Reflections, supra note 97, at 22 (“All the principal treaty agreement 
clauses will now become required for each WTO member.”). 
99 GATT, supra note 19. 
100 Id. art. III(4). 
101 Id. art. I(1). 
102 Id. art. I(2). 
103 See infra notes 177–209 and accompanying text. 
104 See GATT, supra note 19, Preamble (proclaiming that signatories desire “substantial 
reductions of tariffs and other barriers to trade”). 
105 GATT, supra note 19, arts. XIV, XX, XXI. 
106 Id. art. XX. 
107 Infra notes 318–402 and accompanying text. 
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 In the event of a trade conflict, Parties can pursue dispute settle-
ment under the Dispute Settlement Agreement.108 The dispute may be 
initiated and settled through consultations,109 and if consultations fail, 
a Panel will adjudicate on the matter.110 A Panel decision may be ap-
pealed before the Appellate Body on matters of law.111 If a disputed 
measure is found to violate GATT or other agreements, remedies range 
from compliance to imposition of countervailing duties. If all remedies 
fail, the successful Member state can impose sanctions.112 
B. The Climate Treaties: The United Nations Framework Convention  
on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol 
 Climate change mitigation efforts are governed by two principal 
treaties and a series of decisions taken by the Conference of Parties 
(COP) to the UNFCCC.113 The UNFCCC sets out the basic principles 
and general obligations of nations.114 Based on the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibility, UNFCCC classifies nations into 
Annex I and Annex II countries. Annex I comprises developed nations, 
including former Soviet Union countries that are considered econo-
mies in transition.115 Annex II comprises developed nations, except 
emerging economies.116 Both Annex I and II signatories have a general 
responsibility to reduce GHG emissions,117 but Annex II nations are 
responsible for providing economic assistance for technology transfer 
to developing countries, as well as for mitigation and adaptation ef-
forts.118 
                                                                                                                      
108 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/28-dsu.pdf and http://perma.cc/H5AA-YACC; see David Palmeter & Petros C. 
Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 398, 399 (1998). 
109 DSU, supra note 108, arts. 4, 5. 
110 Id. art. 6. 
111 Id. art. 17(4). 
112 Id. arts. 21, 22. 
113 UNFCCC, supra note 7; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3; see also Meetings, United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/ 
6240.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) available at http://perma.cc/DVE6-PF2T. 
114 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 2, 3, 4. 
115 Id. Annex I. 
116 Id. Annex II. 
117 Id. art. 4(1). 
118 Id. art. 4(3)–4(5). 
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 The Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC provides the legal scheme to im-
plement the goals of UNFCCC.119 To achieve a balance between rights 
of developing countries and obligations of developed countries, it cre-
ates a property right to emit carbon dioxide.120 Based on historic dif-
ferences in emissions, the Protocol requires only Annex I signatories to 
reduce their emissions by a particular percentage, based on the base-
line year 1990.121 Each Annex I signatory is allocated a certain amount 
of emissions allowance per year, known as the “Assigned Amount,” and 
is required to reduce its emissions by 5 percent below the 1990 emis-
sions level.122 Economies in transition can follow a different baseline 
year.123 GHGs covered are set out in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, 
and assigned amounts (emissions allowances) are listed in Annex B.124 
The first commitment period for reducing emissions ran between 2008 
and 2012.125 
 The Protocol provides three flexible mechanisms to facilitate emis-
sions reduction: joint implementation, a clean development mecha-
nism (CDM), and emissions trading.126 Each mechanism is designed to 
enable Parties to locate the most economically efficient means to transi-
tion from fossil fuels to alternative energy. The emissions trading 
scheme establishes carbon dioxide as a commodity that can be traded 
and priced in the market.127 This mechanism aims to promote invest-
ments in low carbon technology by legally limiting the availability of 
CO2 in the market and thereby increasing the price of carbon in the 
long run.128 Joint implementation permits Annex I signatories to invest 
in projects in other countries with higher investment returns, to pro-
mote low CO2-emitting technology.129 The CDM allows developed 
countries to invest in low carbon technology in developing countries in 
exchange for credits that count toward their legal obligation to reduce 
                                                                                                                      
119 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3. 
120 See id. arts. 3, 17; Edwin Woerdman, The Institutional Economics of Market-
Based Climate Policy 10–11 (2004) (noting that Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol estab-
lishes an international market for GHG emissions). 
121 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3(1). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. art. 3(5). 
124 Id. Annex A, Annex B. 
125 Kyle W. Danish, The International Regime, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law 
31 (Michael Gerrard ed., 2007). 
126 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 12, 17; see Danish, supra note 125, at 42. 
127 See Woerdman, supra note 120, at 10–11. 
128 See Danish, supra note 125, at 42–43. 
129 See id. at 44. 
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GHG emissions.130 Additionally, major emitting nations have agreed, as 
part of COP meeting declarations such as the Copenhagen Accord and 
the Durban Platform, to provide funding to assist developing countries 
in climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.131 
 No emissions reduction obligations or funding obligations are im-
posed on non-Annex I and non-Annex II signatories.132 This includes 
all developing countries and encompasses emerging economies such as 
Brazil, China, and India. This exclusion has become a bone of conten-
tion as nations continue to negotiate a post-2012 legal framework.133 
C. The Competition and Leakage Problem 
 The cumulative effect of WTO and climate change treaties creates 
leakage and loss of competitiveness challenges that undermine collec-
tive climate change mitigation efforts.134 WTO regulation of trade bar-
riers and discriminatory treatment has created increasingly open bor-
ders for goods, services, and investments and has thereby provided 
opportunities to achieve global economic efficiency.135 Such malleabil-
ity of borders enables firms in Annex I countries to avoid GHG emis-
sions regulations by moving to other markets, notably emerging econ-
omies such as Brazil, China, or India, which do not have comparable 
emissions reduction obligations.136 Certain carbon-intensive sectors 
might be particularly vulnerable to the leakage problem.137 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
130 See id. at 46. 
131 See Richard K. Lattanzio, Congressional Research Service, International 
Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF) 1–7 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41889.pdf and http://perma.cc/3VRJ-ES82 (discuss-
ing the history of the Green Climate Fund). 
132 See Danish, supra note 125, at 34–35. 
133 See id. at 53 (“Another fundamental criticism of the Protocol is that it does not ex-
tend commitments to developing countries, including major emitters such as China and 
India.”). 
134 See IEA Carbon Leakage Report, supra note 26, at 3 (“[D]ifferences in returns on 
capital associated with unilateral mitigation action provides incentives for firms to relocate 
capital to countries with less stringent climate policies.”). 
135 See, e.g., infra notes 177–209 and accompanying text (discussing WTO regulation of 
protectionist subsidies). 
136 See Moser, supra note 27, at 677–78 (“Leakage causes negative impacts not only by 
allowing emissions to shift from one country to another, but, more importantly, by inhibit-
ing the advancement of clean energy technologies. This is especially true for countries like 
China, that are developing and are favored targets for foreign direct investment.)” 
137 See IEA Carbon Leakage Report, supra note 26, at 39 (“[I]f full auctioning of CO2 
allowances became the general rule of allocation, for some of the most carbon-intensive 
industries such as cement, blast-furnace steel and some basic chemicals, carbon leakage 
could be significant enough to warrant countervailing policy intervention.”); see also Pau-
 
22 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:1 
ple, even though Washington State is regulating coal consumption,138 
there is an increase in coal export from Washington State to China.139 
Furthermore, Annex I countries cannot impose higher tariffs on im-
ported goods produced in non-Annex I countries within the framework 
of WTO rules, except in certain limited circumstances.140 Consequent-
ly, firms in Annex I countries, which are subject to environmental re-
strictions that aren’t imposed on non-Annex I competitors, can suffer 
loss of competitiveness, a problem that is already a documented conse-
quence of lopsided environmental and labor regulations in WTO 
member states.141 
 Addressing these problems under WTO law presents several legal 
hurdles. Suggested solutions range from the imposition of border tax 
adjustments under Article II:2(a) of GATT to providing incentives to 
developing countries under the generalized system of preferences, but 
each presents several problems, particularly that of ensuring WTO-
compliant enforcement.142 
 Even though exceptions could be invoked, the Kyoto Protocol 
does not provide the legal arsenal. Not only does the exclusion of 
emerging major economies that are also major GHG emitters increase 
leakage and competitiveness problems, but the three main Kyoto Pro-
tocol mechanisms for reducing emissions—CDM, emissions trading, 
and joint implementation—provide a limited remedy that does not ad-
dress these problems.143 Furthermore, Article 3(5) of UNFCCC and 
                                                                                                                      
welyn, supra note 36, at 6 (noting that the carbon leakage problem might be exaggerated, 
but that in certain sectors carbon leakage occurs and causes increases in emissions); 
Vanden Brink, supra note 24, at 92–93 (noting that only six U.S. industries could suffer 
competitive losses— “petroleum, refining, paper and pulp, nonmetallic mineral products, 
chemicals and ferrous and nonferrous metals”); World Bank, supra note 26, at 253 (not-
ing that even though high-income countries are bigger net exporters of energy-intensive 
products, emissions reduction policies could lead to leakage with manufactures moving to 
low-income countries). 
138 See Jeremy Lawrence, Note, The Western Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration 
and Constitutional Structure in the United States and Canada, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1225, 1228, 
1238 (2009). 
139 Moser, supra note 27, at 677–78 (noting that coal consumption is increasing in Chi-
na and India, and that Washington state is setting up a port to export coal to China). 
Leakage has generally been low for the EU, but over-allocation of carbon allowances has 
diminished the effectiveness of its emissions reduction efforts. Id. at 689. 
140 See infra notes 177–209 and accompanying text. 
141 To the extent that the problem already exists, leakage might be less pronounced. 
See, e.g., Moser, supra note 27, at 689. 
142 See Deepa Badrinarayana, Trading Up Kyoto: A Proposal to Amend the Protocol, Part II 
(forthcoming). 
143 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 12, 17; see also Moser, supra note 27, at 677–
78 (noting potential carbon leakage from the U.S. to China and India via increased coal 
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Article 2(3) of the Kyoto Protocol reiterate the goal of preserving the 
trading system and not imposing trade barriers.144 
 Consequently, major emitters remain unmoved by economic or 
moral arguments to accept binding emissions reduction obligations.145 
On the contrary, an increasing number of major emitters are reconsid-
ering their commitment under the current structure of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.146 Notably, Canada, Japan, and Russia bowed to competition 
pressure and rejected a second phase of emissions reduction obliga-
tions under the Protocol.147 The RES issue discussed below demon-
strates that the combination of WTO law and the Kyoto Protocol does 
not promote climate mitigation efforts, and that a solution does not lie 
within WTO rules alone due to the inherent pressure of competition 
that the divergent goals of the two treaties create. 
II. The Link Between Renewable Energy Subsidies, WTO Law, 
and Climate Change Mitigation 
 This part introduces the important link between energy and cli-
mate mitigation action, as well as the unique legal challenges to diversi-
fying energy to mitigate climate change in a global, liberalized econo-
my. This part focuses particularly on competition problems associated 
with promoting renewable energy. 
                                                                                                                      
exports); World Bank, supra note 26, at 253 (noting that carbon leakage might be occur-
ring in 2010, nearly 20 years after Kyoto.) 
144 UNFCCC Article 3(5), supra note 7. This article requires states to maintain the in-
ternational economic system and requires Members to ensure that “[m]easures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” Id.; 
see also Michael McKenzie, Climate Change and the Generalized System of Preferences, 11 J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 679, 684 (2008) (“Article 3(5) of the UNFCCC specifically warns against the use 
of trade restrictions to combat climate change.”). This approach flows from Agenda 21, 
which recognizes increased market access as an important tool for addressing environmen-
tal problems. See United Nations Environment Programme, Agenda 21, UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 ¶ 2.5 (1992) (“[I]mproved market access for developing countries’ ex-
ports in conjunction with sound environmental policies would have positive environmental 
impact and therefore make an important contribution towards sustainable develop-
ment.”). Article 2(3) of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, urges Annex I Parties to mini-
mize the negative impacts on international trade of climate change mitigation measures. 
145 See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1610–12 (noting that the Kyoto Proto-
col would place an unfair burden on the United States compared to developing countries, 
and dismissing both distributive justice and corrective justice as rationales for climate ac-
tion). 
146 See What Doha Did, supra note 2. 
147 See COP 16, supra note 1, at 6. 
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 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction, notably reduction of 
carbon dioxide from fossil fuel sources, is a central climate change mit-
igation strategy.148 Alternative sources of energy, such as renewable en-
ergy, that have lower carbon emissions are gaining importance as sub-
stitutes.149 Renewable energy includes energy harnessed from 
renewable resources such as solar, wind, and water.150 Availability of af-
fordable renewable energy is critical to climate change mitigation.151 
Energy diversification also yields co-benefits from national security and 
economic standpoints. National energy portfolio diversification de-
creases fossil fuel imports and provides economic safeguards against 
price increases caused by higher global demand for fossil fuels.152 
 Without legal and policy intervention, however, fossil fuels will re-
main the primary source of energy through 2035,153 for at least two rea-
sons. First, existing law and policies do subsidize fossil fuels.154 Second, 
renewable energy technology remains expensive and is not competitive 
with fossil fuel sources in the short term.155 
 The Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms promote investments in 
alternative energy, including renewable energy, in Annex I as well as 
non-Annex I countries.156 The clean development mechanism provides 
incentives to Annex I signatories to invest in carbon-reducing technol-
ogies, including renewable energy, in non-Annex I countries.157 Joint 
implementation and emissions trading provide incentives for Annex I 
countries to invest in renewable energy.158 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 33, at 7. 
149 See id. at 7–9. 
150 Id. at 8–9. 
151 Id. at 7. 
152 See Ben Block, Energy Agency Predicts High Prices in Future, Worldwatch Inst., 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5936 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014), available at http:// 
perma.cc/TZ7H-UTSJ (citing a report of the International Energy Agency that predicted 
rising energy prices to account for growing demand); cf. Int’l Energy Agency, Key 
World Energy Statistics 30 (2011), available at http://iea.org/textbase/nppdf/ 
free/2011/key_world_energy_stats.pdf and http://perma.cc/6W45-5D4D [hereinafter 
Key Energy Statistics] (showing that total energy consumption in the world nearly 
doubled between 1973 and 2009). 
153 See Key Energy Statistics, supra note 152, at 46 (predicting oil and coal to com-
prise more than half of the world’s energy in 2035 under a current policy scenario). 
154 See, e.g., Envtl. L. Inst., Estimating U.S. Government Subsidies to Energy 
Sources: 2002–2008, at 3 (2009) (“The federal government provided substantially larger 
subsidies to fossil fuels than to renewables.”). 
155 See Matthew L. Wald, Cost Works Against Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources in 
Time of Recession, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2009, at A18. 
156 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 12. 
157 See Danish, supra note 125, at 46. 
158 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 17. 
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 Several major emitting nations, including non-signatories of the 
Kyoto Protocol, have adopted laws to catalyze renewable energy use.159 
For example, in the United States, thirty-one states and the District of 
Columbia have passed several renewable energy laws.160 Most of these 
states have established Clean Energy Standards, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, or Renewable Energy Standards.161 Several of these laws re-
quire electricity suppliers to purchase a fixed percentage of electricity 
from renewable energy sources.162 These are commonly known as feed-
in tariffs.163 Several other countries have passed laws and adopted vari-
ous policies that provide economic incentives to promote renewable 
energy.164 These include subsidized loans to manufacturers of renewa-
                                                                                                                      
159 See Joel B. Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?, 35 
Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 18–33 (2010) (discussing China’s law and policy); 
Hao Zhang, China’s Low Carbon Strategy: The Role of Renewable Energy Law in Advancing Re-
newable Energy, 2 Renewable Energy L. & Pol’y Rev. 133, 135–41 (2011) (evaluating Chi-
na’s energy law and challenges); Joshua Prentice, Making Effective Use of Australia’s Natural 
Resources—The Record of Australian Renewable Energy Law Under the Renewable Energy (Electrici-
ty) Act 2000 (Cth), 1 Renewable Energy L. & Pol’y Rev. 5, 8–14 (2011) (discussing Aus-
tralia’s energy law on renewable energy and arguing for a better incentive program to 
foster growth of renewable energy); Martin Lythgoe, Renewable Generation in Argentina: Past 
Failures and a Plan for Future Success, 31 Hous. J. Int’l L. 263, 304–11 (2009) (discussing 
Argentina’s model renewable energy law); Giovanna Golini, Tradeable Green Certificate Sys-
tems in the E.U., 26 Energy L.J. 111, 113–33 (2005) (providing an overview of trading sys-
tems to promote renewable energy in many EU Member states); Steven Ferrey et al., Fire 
and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 
20 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 125, 131–56 (2010) (outlining measures taken in the United 
States to promote renewable energy). 
160 See Detailed Table of State Policies, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
http://www.c2es.org/node/9340 (follow “Detailed Table of State Policies” hyperlink) (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/G4N-N4Q3. With the exception of solar 
and wind energy, which are discussed in this Article, the scope of CES or RPS/RES varies 
from state to state. See Comparison of Qualifying Resources for Individual States’ RPS and AEPS, 
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, http://www.c2es.org/node/9340 (follow 
“Comparison of Qualifying Resources” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/G4N-N4Q3. See generally Renewable Energy Comm., Report of the Renewable 
Energy Committee, 29 Energy L.J. 269 (2008) (cataloging recent state projects and judicial 
decisions involving renewable energy). 
161 Clean Energy Standards, Center for Climate Change and Energy Solutions, 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/policy-solutions/clean-energy-standards (last visited Jan. 8, 
2014), available at http://perma.cc/W3JB-3F5B. 
162 See Feed-In Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www. 
eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/4PTA-7CN6. 
163 See id. For a discussion of specific feed-in tariffs, see infra notes 221–241 and accom-
panying text. 
164 See generally REN21, Renewables 2012 Global Status Report (2012), available at 
http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/Resources/GSR2012_low%20res_FINAL.pdf 
 
26 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:1 
ble energy equipment, price guarantees and access to grids, and incen-
tives to consumers.165 
 Nevertheless, there are several challenges to renewable energy ex-
pansion. These include checkered state laws,166 poor energy distribu-
tion infrastructure,167 challenges to siting wind and solar equipment,168 
expenses,169 and questionable renewable energy legislation.170 Addi-
tionally, energy diversification presents leakage and competition chal-
lenges.171 
 In countries such as the United States, where the national econo-
my is anchored to fossil fuel industries, energy diversification threatens 
employment.172 Popular support for renewable energy subsidies (RES) 
thus hinges on energy reform that yields economic benefits, such as job 
creation and national economic growth.173 To address this issue, na-
tions are designing subsidies to promote renewable energy, as well as 
                                                                                                                      
and http://perma.cc/4KX7-YCR6 (discussing international renewable energy trends, law, 
and policy). 
165 See id. at 70–72; United Nations Energy Programme, Global Trends in Renew-
able Energy Investment 12–13 (2012) (listing major investors in renewable energy). 
166 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Elec-
tricity Requirement, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 361, 365–71 (arguing that state RPS standards are 
imperfect and inconsistent). 
167 Id. at 377–79. See generally Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to 
Accommodate New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 Envtl. L. 977 (2009) (discussing strate-
gies to establish infrastructure for renewable energy). 
168 Renewable Energy Comm., supra note 160, at 276; Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable En-
ergy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1021, 1040–62 (2012) (discussing 
challenges to siting wind turbines and solar panels, and the role of the public trust doc-
trine in addressing the challenges); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative 
Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 1049, 
1063–76 (2009) (discussing challenges to siting wind turbines). 
169 See, e.g., United Nations Energy Programme, supra note 165, at 14 (noting that 
global economic pressure hinders investment in renewable energy); Envtl. L. Inst., supra 
note 154, at 3 (noting that fossil fuels were offered more than double the subsidies given 
to renewable energy); Wald, supra note 155, at A18 (noting the greater cost of renewable 
energy compared to fossil fuels). 
170 See, e.g., United Nations Energy Programme, supra note 165, at 15 (detailing 
complaints about mismanaged renewable energy subsidies in the United States and Eu-
rope). 
171 See Moser, supra note 27, at 677–78 (noting potential carbon leakage from the Unit-
ed States to China and India via increased coal exports); World Bank, supra note 26, at 
253 (noting that statistical trends suggest carbon leakage was occurring as of 2010). 
172 See 155 Cong. Rec. S202, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. Inhofe); 154 Cong. Rec. 
S4022, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. Voinovich). 
173 See Kelvin Ross, IEA Bids to Keep Climate Goals Alive Without Harming Economic Growth, 
RenewableEnergyWorld.com, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/ 
2013/06/iea-bids-to-keep-climate-goals-alive-without-harming-economic-growth (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/6TVF-NYSR. 
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catalyze economic growth and creation of domestic employment.174 
The disputed subsidies that require minimum domestic content use 
discussed in this Article are examples.175 
 The problem is that such subsidies are protectionist in nature and 
violate World Trade Organization (WTO) law, which aims to reduce 
trade barriers and protectionism.176 To the extent that these subsidies 
violate WTO rules and require countries to remove protectionist 
measures, they threaten climate change mitigation efforts because a 
country’s self-interest in providing incentives might diminish if such 
incentives fail to address economic and competition issues. The RES 
disputes discussed below are important illustrations of this problem. 
III. RES Disputes: The Conflict Between Trade Law and Climate 
Change Mitigation 
 The renewable energy subsidies (RES) disputes against Canada, 
China, and the European Union (EU) invoke, among other World 
Trade Organization (WTO) laws, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) with respect to certain renewable energy subsidies. 
This part provides an overview of the ASCM and TRIMs, as well as the 
RES disputes involving Canada, China, and the EU. 
A. ASCM in Brief 
 ASCM is a specific agreement under the umbrella of WTO. All 
WTO Members, including Canada, China, and all members of the EU, 
are signatories. The ASCM disciplines direct or indirect financial con-
tribution made by a government, any public body, or a private body 
under the instruction of the government.177 Grants, loans, equity infu-
sion, loan guarantees, foregone revenues in the form of tax credits, and 
provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure, as well 
as certain types of price support, constitute financial contribution un-
der ASCM.178 
                                                                                                                      
174 See Ghosh & Gangania, supra note 67, at 28–36 (examining clean energy subsidies 
in six countries). 
175 See infra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
176 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 19, Preamble (proclaiming that signatories desire “sub-
stantial reductions of tariffs and other barriers to trade”). 
177 ASCM, supra note 45, art. 1.1(a)(1). 
178 Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i)–(iii). Any subsidy that confers a trade advantage to a Member, 
either by increasing exports or reducing imports of products under Article XVI(1), is also 
disciplined. Id. art. 1.1(a)(2). 
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 ASCM does not disallow or regulate all financial contributions, 
only those that are specific to certain enterprises179 and that confer a 
benefit.180 Specificity means that a financial contribution is given to a 
certain sector, industry, or region,181 or to a limited number of enter-
prises.182 De facto or de jure subsidies that are contingent on export 
performance (export subsidies) or the use of domestic products over 
imported goods (local content use subsidies) are deemed specific.183 
 Providing a financial contribution that is generally unavailable in 
the marketplace constitutes a benefit.184 A financial contribution that 
does not confer a benefit, or a benefit to which a government does not 
make a financial contribution, is not disciplined under ASCM.185 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. arts. 1.2, 2.1 (noting that a “specific” subsidy is one directed at “an enterprise or 
industry or group of enterprises or industries”). 
180 Id. art. 1.1(b). 
181 Id. arts. 2.1, 2.2. 
182 Id. art. 2.2(c). A determination of specificity may be made if, based on an evalua-
tion of economic activities and length of the subsidy program, it is determined that a lim-
ited number of enterprises use the subsidy, certain enterprises predominantly use the sub-
sidy, certain enterprises are granted disproportionately large amounts of subsidy, or that 
discretionary authority exercised in granting the subsidy indicates specificity. Id. 
183 ASCM, supra note 45, arts. 3.1(a)–(b). 
184 See id. art. 14. 
185 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 157, 
WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://goo.gl/g5TRDe and http://perma. 
cc/8K4P-SX3G (noting that “financial contribution” and “benefit” are two separate legal 
elements that must be read together to determine the existence of a subsidy); Appellate 
Body Report, Canada–Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 156, WT/DS70/ 
AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada–Aircraft], available at http://goo.gl/KUTyS2 and 
http://perma.cc/7F7-U3VK (noting that “financial contribution” and “benefit” are two 
discrete elements in defining a subsidy); Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and 
State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective 108–09 (2010) (“The Appel-
late Body has promptly underlined that the ‘financial contribution’ is separate from the 
‘benefit’ and that these two elements together determine whether a subsidy exists.”). The 
Appellate Body has also held that a financial contribution can be made directly or indirect-
ly. Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, ¶¶ 107, 108, 114, WT/ 
DS296/AB/R ( June 27, 2005), available at http://goo.gl/8VpAZ7 and http://perma.cc/ 
NH78-5XRZ; Appellate Body Report, United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 52 n.35, WT/DS257/AB/R ( Jan. 19, 
2004) [hereinafter U.S.–Softwood Lumber], available at http://goo.gl/6k3gtn and http:// 
perma.cc/9KXY-X4B2; see also Panel Report, United States–Measures Treating Export Restraints 
as Subsidies, ¶ 8.53, WT/DS194/R ( June 29, 2001), available at http://goo.gl/ybsyuY and 
http://perma.cc/B83V-PVWX (noting that subparagraph (iv) of ASCM identified the 
actor but did not expand coverage of financial contribution beyond that stated in subpar-
agraphs (i)–(iii); Rubini, supra, at 111. 
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 The degree of restriction on subsidies under ASCM depends on 
the type of subsidy.186 Domestic subsidies are actionable if they cause 
“adverse effects to the interests of other Members.”187 The subsidy must 
(1) cause injury to the domestic industry of another WTO Member,188 
(2) nullify or impair benefits under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),189 or (3) cause “serious prejudice to [their] inter-
ests.”190 Establishing any of these factors is a complex and cumbersome 
task.191 If a complainant succeeds in an actionable subsidy claim,192 the 
subsidizing Member must remove the adverse effect or the entire sub-
sidy, or else face countervailing measures.193 Although the case of Chi-
na involved an actionable subsidy claim, this Article does not address 
actionable subsidies because of the fact-specific nature in evaluating 
whether the requirements are satisfied. 
                                                                                                                      
186 See ASCM, supra note 45, arts. 4, 7 (noting that prohibited subsidies may be with-
drawn, and that subsidies with “adverse effects” may be remedied by modification). 
187 Id. art. 5. 
188 Id. art. 5(a). Domestic industry includes “producers as a whole of the like products 
or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion 
of the total domestic production of those products.” Any producer who is connected to an 
importer or exporter, or who imports identical products from the subsidized producers or 
other sources, is not included in the definition. Id. art. 16.1. Injury is determined by con-
sidering whether there is significant increase in the import volume of subsidized goods, 
whether they undercut the price of “like” or identical domestic products, whether they 
depress prices significantly, and whether they affect “domestic producers of such prod-
ucts.” Id. arts. 15.1, 15.2. 
189 Id. art. 5(b). 
190 Id. art. 5(c). 
191 Id. art. 15.7. A causal link between a subsidy and material injury must be factually 
established, and the following factors must be considered cumulatively: (i) the trade ef-
fects of the subsidy, (ii) significant increase of subsidized imports, (iii) an imminent, sub-
stantial increase in exports to complainant’s domestic market, (iv) “significant depressing 
or suppressing effect on domestic prices” that will increase demand for imported goods, 
and (v) product inventories. Id. Special prejudice exists if a subsidy effectively: (i) “dis-
place[s] or [impedes] the exports of a like product of another Member into the market of 
the subsidizing Member,” (ii) “displaces or [impedes] the exports of a like product of an-
other Member from a third country market,” (iii) significantly undercuts the price and 
competition of a like domestic product in the same market, or (iv) increases the global 
market share of the subsidized product more than its average share in the past three years. 
Id. art. 6.3. Furthermore, the ASCM disallows a finding of serious prejudice where there 
might be trade imbalances in the subsidized product because of voluntary or certain in-
voluntary decisions made by the complaining member regarding export or import of the 
product. Id. art. 6.7. 
192 Usually, actionable subsidies are subject to an internal investigation, followed by 
consultations if a subsidy is determined to exist. If consultations fail, the Parties may refer 
the matter to a WTO Dispute Settlement Body. ASCM, supra note 45, art. 7. 
193 Id. art. 7.9. Part V of the ASCM has detailed provisions regarding the process for 
imposing countervailing measures, including calculation of benefits and injury. See id. arts. 
10–23. 
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 Subsidies that are conditioned on export performance or local 
content use are prohibited under ASCM.194 Unlike actionable subsi-
dies, the remedy against a prohibited subsidy is withdrawal of the same, 
and if withdrawal fails, affected members can impose countervailing 
measures.195 
 ASCM specifically permits Members to provide certain subsidies. 
These non-actionable subsidies include subsidies to promote specific 
research and research-related purposes.196 Until 2008,197 ASCM also 
permitted subsidies to assist “existing facilities”198 adapt to “new envi-
ronmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which re-
sult in greater constraints and financial burden on firms.”199 
 In sum, WTO regulation of subsidies can be classified into three 
categories: (1) prohibited subsidies (export and domestic content use 
subsidies), (2) actionable subsidies, and (3) non-actionable subsidies.200 
A Member granting a prohibited or actionable subsidy must withdraw 
the subsidy or its adverse effect, respectively. This Article addresses 
prohibited subsidies in relation to the four disputes. 
B. TRIMs in Brief 
 Governments have traditionally used trade-related investment 
measures to protect domestic industries by conditioning investments 
on certain requirements or by imposing limits on foreign direct in-
vestments (FDIs). For example, subsidies might be conditional on en-
terprises using domestic content, or FDIs might be controlled to pro-
mote specific industries.201 Such measures run contrary to the WTO’s 
goal of trade liberalization and removal of protectionism.202 
 TRIMs regulates certain protectionist investment measures. Article 
2 primarily requires WTO Members to comply with GATT Articles III 
                                                                                                                      
194 Id. arts. 3.1, 3.2. 
195 Id. arts. 4.7, 4.10, 4.11. 
196 Id. arts. 8.1, 8.2(a). 
197 Id. art. 8.2(c)(i)–(v). 
198 ASCM, supra note 45, art. 8.2(c) & n.33 (defining existing facilities as those that 
were in existence at least two years before the environmental regulation was passed). 
199 Id. art. 8.2(c). 
200 Id. arts. 3, 5, 8. 
201 See Robert H. Edwards, Jr. & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 33 Stan. J. Int’l L. 169, 
176–86 (1997) (discussing the types of controls that countries generally impose on invest-
ments, as well as specific examples of nations that impose such controls). 
202 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 19, Preamble. 
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and XI.203 The Annex to TRIMs provides an illustrative list of measures 
that violate these provisions.204 Measures that violate GATT Article III 
include mandatory or enforceable domestic law and, specifically, laws 
that make the availability of an advantage conditional on domestic con-
tent use.205 This provision is akin to the prohibited subsidies disciplined 
under ASCM.206 In addition to monitoring compliance under an ad-
ministrative mechanism,207 WTO Members can resolve any disputes 
under TRIMs through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.208 Un-
like ASCM, Article III expressly stipulates that GATT exceptions, in-
cluding Article XX exceptions, apply to TRIMs.209 
C. The RES Disputes 
 This section briefly explains the four disputes relating to RES and 
focuses primarily on the issue of prohibited subsidies and TRIMs. Be-
cause the details of two disputes, EU–Feed-In Tariffs and India–Solar, 
are evolving, and because the China–Renewable Energy subsidy is 
pending China’s challenge to some of the United States’s countervail-
ing measures, this section and the Article draw primarily on the Cana-
da-Feed-In Tariff dispute, which a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body 
recently decided. 
1. China–Wind and Solar Equipment 
 After an investigation in response to a petition of AFL-CIO before 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the United States filed a WTO 
complaint against China’s subsidies to its renewable energy sector.210 
                                                                                                                      
203 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2.1. The referenced GATT articles govern na-
tional treatment and quantitative restrictions. See GATT, supra note 19, arts. III, XI. 
204 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2(2), Annex. 
205 Id. Annex, ¶ 1 (noting that domestic measures requiring “the purchase or use by an 
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic sources, whether specified 
in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a 
proportion of volume or value of its local production” are inconsistent with Article III of 
GATT 1994). 
206 See ASCM, supra note 45, art. 3.1(b). 
207 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 7 (establishing a Committee on Trade-
Related Investment Measures to monitor Members’ compliance with the TRIMs Agree-
ment). 
208 Id. art. 8. 
209 Id. art. 3. 
210 Petition for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: Chi-
na’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technology, Sept. 9, 2010 [herein-
after Section 301 Petition], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09-09-
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The petition alleged that China’s Renewable Energy Law provided sev-
eral of its wind and solar equipment manufacturers with a financial 
benefit conditioned on domestic content use or export performance, 
which would be prohibited subsidies.211 Petitioners claimed that China 
discriminated against foreign producers in China by favoring domestic 
producers or by requiring local content use from such producers as a 
prerequisite to receive permits.212 Petitioners also argued that China 
discriminated against foreign applicants under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
clean development mechanism, in violation of Article III:4 of GATT,213 
by imposing several localization practices. These practices included re-
quiring foreign producers to partner with a local industry and share 
research and development, mandating the use of local suppliers for 
parts, and imposing price control on minerals.214 
 The USTR investigation concluded that China’s subsidies violated 
ASCM,215 and the United States initiated WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings.216 In its complaint, the United States challenged a Chinese 
Special Fund program that required the use of domestic content.217 
The EU and Japan joined as third parties.218 The United States and 
China settled the dispute through consultations, and China revoked 
some of the challenged subsidies.219 The United States has imposed 
                                                                                                                      
2010%20Petition.pdf and http://perma.cc/V3AH-DHVX; China–Wind Equipment, supra note 
49. 
211 Section 301 Petition, supra note 210, at 89–99 (alleging that in exchange for using 
domestic wind turbines, China’s “Ride the Wind” Program provided a low interest loan to 
export buyers and a power purchase guarantee to wind farm operators, and gave favorable 
tax treatment to foreign joint ventures). China’s Export Credit program allegedly granted 
research funding and support for enterprises to undertake infrastructure projects in Afri-
ca, contingent upon export performance. It also allegedly provided generous export cred-
it insurance to green technologies or products through Sinosure, a large insurance com-
pany. Id. at 73, 76–78. 
212 Id. at 104–14. 
213 Id. at 99–104. 
214 Id. at 91–99. The remainder of this Article focuses only on subsidies. 
215 See China Ends Wind Power Subsidies, supra note 54 (noting that the USTR investigation 
resulted in allegations before the WTO that the disputed subsidies violated the ASCM). 
216 See China–Wind Equipment, supra note 49. 
217 Id. (claiming that China’s Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Provisional 
Measure on Administration of Special Fund for Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment, includ-
ing the Annex on Provisional Measures on Administration of Special Fund for Industrialization of 
Wind Power Equipment, and relevant documents, violated the ASCM). 
218 Request to Join Consultations by the European Union, China–Measures Concerning 
Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/2 ( Jan. 14, 2011); Request to Join Consultations by 
Japan, China–Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/3 ( Jan. 19, 2011). 
219 See China Ends Wind Power Subsidies, supra note 54. 
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countervailing tariffs to neutralize the effect of some actionable subsi-
dies on solar panels that China continues to provide.220 
2. Canada–Feed-In Tariff 
 In 2011, Japan and the EU separately challenged an energy law of 
a Canadian province, Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
of 2009 (OGEA), before the WTO. The WTO consolidated the two dis-
putes: Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector,221 and Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program.222 
 The challenged law, OGEA, establishes a feed-in tariff (FIT) pro-
gram to encourage renewable energy production and use.223 The pro-
gram provides renewable energy producers guaranteed electricity pric-
es, access to grids, and long-term contracts. It conditions the FIT 
benefits on producers using a minimum amount of equipment from 
Ontario.224 Depending on the type of renewable energy and the elec-
tricity generated, the required domestic content ranged from 25% to 
60% in 2011.225 OGEA requires the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to 
implement FIT according to the directions of the Ministry of Energy 
and Infrastructure, the authority that imposed the challenged domestic 
                                                                                                                      
220 See Keith Bradsher & Diane Cardwell, China Solar Panels Face Big Tariffs, N.Y. Times, 
May 18, 2012, at B1; Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China, Inv. 
Nos. 701-TA-41 and 731-TA-1190, U.S. Trade Comm’n Pub. 4295 (Dec. 2011) (prelimi-
nary) [hereinafter China Solar Investigation], available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade_ 
remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2011/bottom_mount_refrigerators/final/PDF/ 
Publication_4295_Solar%20cells.pdf and http://perma.cc/J4J2-LHH7. 
221 Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Canada–Japan Panel 
Request], available at http://goo.gl/im3QPE and http://perma.cc/7XAH-X8UB. 
222 Request for Consultations by the European Union, Canada–Measures Related to the 
Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Canada–EU Panel Re-
quest], available at http://goo.gl/IUoOiH and http://perma.cc/ESJ9-DX5Q. 
223 Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009, § 7(4) [hereinafter OGEA], availa-
ble at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2009/elaws_src_s09012 
_e.htm and http://perma.cc/MCJ9-96D8 (“‘[F]eed-in tariff program’ means a program 
for procurement, including a procurement process, providing standard program rules, 
standard contracts and standard pricing regarding classes of generation facilities differen-
tiated by energy source or fuel type, generator capacity and the manner by which the gen-
eration facility is used, deployed, installed or located.”). 
224 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 3.1(b). 
225 See Marie Wilke, Getting FIT for the WTO: Canadian Green Energy Support Under Scrutiny, 
Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., http://ictsd.org/i/news/bioresreview/ 
103562 (April 2011), available at http://perma.cc/VE6-CJVE. 
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content requirements.226 Japan claimed in its challenge that OGEA vio-
lated ASCM, GATT’s most-favored nation (MFN) treatment clause and 
national treatment provisions, and the TRIMs.227 Other WTO Members 
reserved their right to join the dispute as third parties.228 
 The EU challenged OGEA on the same grounds.229 Other WTO 
Members reserved rights to join as third parties in this dispute as 
well.230 Pursuant to Canada’s request, the WTO Panel consolidated the 
disputes.231 The crux of the complaints was that Canada violated ASCM 
by providing prohibited subsidies that benefit producers.232 
 In its first written submission to the WTO Panel, Canada asserted 
that OGEA did not confer a benefit and that the purchase amounted to 
a government procurement, which is permitted under ASCM.233 Cana-
da argued that it purchased electricity from producers, and at the same 
time it challenged the benchmark that Japan and the EU used to prove 
that OGEA conferred a benefit.234 Although a majority of the Panel 
agreed with Canada on the ASCM argument, the Panel nevertheless 
found that the measure violated TRIMs in imposing domestic content 
requirements. 
                                                                                                                      
226 OGEA, supra note 223, § 7(3) (“[T]he Minister shall issue, and the OPA shall follow 
in preparing its feed-in tariff program, directions that set out the goals relating to domestic 
content to be achieved during the period to be covered by the program.”). 
227 Canada–Japan Panel Request, supra note 221. 
228 These include Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, El Salvador, the European 
Union, Honduras, India, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. See 
Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 1.8. 
229 Europe alleged that OPA’s domestic content requirement in 2012 violated the 
ASCM. Canada–EU Panel Request, supra note 222. 
230 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 1.8. 
231 Panels Set Up on X-Ray Scanners, Chicken Broiler Products and Renewable Energy Equip-
ment, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/ 
dsb_20jan12_e.htm ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/JH3E-W82J (scroll down 
to section entitled “DS426: Canada—measures relating to the feed-in tariff program”). 
232 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 3.1(a), 3.4(a). Both countries 
also claimed violations of TRIMs and GATT art. III(2), but this Article does not discuss this 
issue. Id. ¶¶ 3.1(b)–(c), 3.4(b)–(c). 
233 Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; 
Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, A-73–A-75 WT/DS412.R/Add.1; 
WT/DS426/R/Add.1 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Addendum], 
available at http://goo.gl/xmUtaq and http://perma.cc/RAR6-2JA9. Under the ASCM, 
the following financial contributions are not considered “benefits”: (1) equity capital pro-
vided according to usual investment practices of private investors in the territory, (2) gov-
ernment loans or loan guarantees that are offered on terms similar to commercial loans, 
and (3) government procurement of goods and services at market value. ASCM, supra 
note 45, art. 14(a)–(d). 
234 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Addendum, supra note 233, at A-73–A-75. 
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 Contrary to the views of some scholars, Canada did not raise an 
environmental defense, in particular climate change mitigation, in its 
first response to the complaint.235 Even if Canada had raised the de-
fense, such an argument probably could not withstand the scrutiny of 
WTO law.236 
3. Evolving Disputes: EU–Renewable Energy, and India–Solar Cells 
 A few European nations, notably Greece and Italy, have adopted 
FIT legislation similar to Ontario’s OGEA to encourage renewable en-
ergy production.237 In turn, China challenged these measures as violat-
ing ASCM, TRIMs, and GATT MFN and national treatment provi-
sions.238 The parties began consultation, and have not reached the 
Panel stage as of January 2014. 
 Similarly, under WTO law the United States has challenged a series 
of programs and standards, including feed-in tariff measures, adopted 
by India’s Ministry of Renewable Energy and New Power through its 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (NSM).239 According to the 
United States, some of the measures under NSM provide feed-in tariffs 
conditioned on solar energy producers using domestically produced 
solar cells and modules, which is domestic content use.240 The United 
States has contended that the measures violate GATT, ASCM, and 
TRIMs provisions that have been the subject of the other three dis-
putes.241 The matter has not reached the Panel stage as of January 
2014. 
 The EU–Renewable Energy and India–Solar Cells and Solar Mod-
ules disputes have left open the question whether an environmental 
defense can be raised for sustaining the subsidies. They also demon-
strate the underpinnings of the competition issue. Again, as discussed 
                                                                                                                      
235 See id. at A-71–A-73 (addressing the GATT claim without reference to the Article 
XX exceptions); Brief for International Institute for Sustainable Development et al. as 
amicus curiae, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector 
(DS412), World Trade Organization Panel, May 10, 2012 [hereinafter Canada Amicus 
Curiae Brief], available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/ecojustice_amicus_curiae_brief. 
pdf and http://perma.cc/7X8R-KXQ6. 
236 See infra notes 295–402 and accompanying text. 
237 See EU–Renewable Energy, supra note 51, at 1–3. 
238 Id. 
239 India–Solar, supra note 52, at 1–2. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. India has denied that the measures violate WTO law. See Amiti Sen, India to De-
fend Local-Buy Policy in Solar Mission as U.S., EU Protest, Econ. Times (Feb. 3, 2012), http:// 
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-03/news/31021273_1_solar-mission-trade-
related-investment-measures-solar-energy, available at http://perma.cc/PX9K-79CN. 
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below and particularly with reference to the Canada–Feed-In Tariff 
Panel decision, an environmental defense to sustain the programs will 
fail under current WTO law. 
IV. The RES Problem: Beyond the Pale of Article XX 
 This part primarily examines whether prohibited subsidies under 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) or 
measures under the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
should qualify for environmental exceptions, and whether the ASCM 
should be amended to accommodate renewable energy subsidies 
(RES). This part also provides a brief overview of the Canada Feed-In 
Tariff Panel decision to provide a background to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX discussion. This Article 
does not evaluate factual data in pending disputes because of limited 
information, but some legal problems with the Panel decision are brief-
ly discussed below.242 
A. ASCM, TRIMs, and RES, with Specific Reference to the WTO  
Canada-Feed-In Tariff Decision 
 The first issue in applying an environmental exception is whether 
the challenged measures violate ASCM provisions. This requires a de-
termination that the measures are subsidies, namely that the govern-
ment provides financial support that confers a benefit.243 The disputed 
measures before the World Trade Organization (WTO) in all four dis-
putes examined in this Article were provided by the government. In 
China–Wind and Solar Equipment, China’s Special Fund provided Chi-
nese wind turbine and solar manufacturers subsidies conditioned on 
export performance and domestic content use.244 The disputed finan-
cial contributions were provided by government entities in China to 
specific sectors.245 Measures to support renewable energy were directed 
through government entities, which is probable in a highly centralized 
government system.246 The fact that China agreed to withdraw the sub-
                                                                                                                      
242 Under DSU, documents related to pending disputes are confidential, though this 
panel is open to limited public attendance. See DSU, supra note 108, art. 18.2. 
243 Supra notes 177–200 and accompanying text. 
244 China–Wind Equipment, supra note 49. 
245 Id.; Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50. 
246 China–Wind Equipment, supra note 49. 
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sidy indicates that the United States’s prohibited subsidies claim might 
have been tenable.247 
 In determining whether to impose tariffs on Chinese materials for 
solar panels, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) only de-
cided whether imports from China caused material injury to similar 
domestic products.248 Nevertheless, as the decision states, the investiga-
tion was based on the allegation that the Chinese government granted 
export subsidies.249 The incidental claims to which the ITC refers in its 
decision, as well as the reports and the imposition of tariffs, suggest that 
China made a financial contribution to its industries that conferred a 
benefit in violation of ASCM.250 Unless China rejects the imposition of 
tariffs and appeals the decision, evaluating the factual data underlying 
the ITC decision will be difficult. 
 Likewise, in the Canada RES dispute, the Ontario Power Authority 
(OPA), a government entity, implemented legislation on renewable 
energy under the direction of the Minister for Energy.251 Although a 
Canadian province (and not the federal government of Canada) passed 
Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009 (OGEA), and 
even though the law only provides a promise, it still constitutes a gov-
ernment measure because price guarantees are a government “price 
support” under ASCM Article 1.1(a)(2).252 These price guarantees are 
comparable to the stumpage arrangement that a Canadian province 
granted to harvesters and that was the subject of dispute in US–Softwood 
Lumber IV.253 In that dispute, the WTO Appellate Body found that har-
vesting rights granted by Canada’s provincial governments constituted 
a government price support, which satisfied the ASCM requirement 
that the measure should be a government financial support.254 Canada 
did not challenge this contention in the feed-in tariff dispute before 
the Panel, but submitted before the Appellate Body that a government 
intervention constituted a form of “income or price support” only if it 
                                                                                                                      
247 See China Ends Wind Power Subsidies, supra note 54. 
248 China Solar Investigation, supra note 220, at 3–30. 
249 Id. at I-4. One of the critical issues was also that much of China’s challenged solar 
equipment was exported, which implies that the grant of subsidies could have imposed 
export requirements. Id. at II-8. 
250 See China Solar Investigation, supra note 220, at II-8; see also China Rejects U.S. Panel 
Ruling that Solar Imports Harm Industry, Bloomberg News (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-04/china-rejects-u-s-trade-panel-s-ruling-that-
solar-imports-harm-industry.html, available at http://perma.cc/NRB2-LHHP. 
251 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.195. 
252 See id. ¶¶ 7.234–.235. 
253 See U.S.–Softwood Lumber, supra note 185, ¶ 45. 
254 Id. ¶ 167. 
38 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:1 
interfered with an existing market for the good and if it affected ex-
ports and imports.255 
 The government measures in EU–Renewable Energy and India–Solar 
are price guarantees provided by the respective governments. Thus, the 
challenged price guarantees provided by the governments of Canada, 
China, EU nations, and India constitute financial contributions under 
Article 1 of ASCM. 
 The contentious issue revolves around the question of whether the 
financial contribution confers a benefit—a financial arrangement that 
the recipient could not obtain in the marketplace.256 As the Appellate 
Body held in Canada–Aircraft, for a benefit to be conferred, a financial 
contribution must first be made.257 Under Article 1.1(b) of the ASCM, 
a government contribution is considered to confer a benefit if an in-
vestment decision runs contrary to the market practice of private inves-
tors in the territory.258 The ASCM provides a list of benchmarks in Arti-
cle 14 to establish whether a financial contribution constitutes a 
benefit.259 Notably, a comparison is made between the market price in 
an exporting market and the price at which the good is procured.260 
Another test is whether the contribution reduces the cost of produc-
tion.261 In two decisions, U.S.–Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain 
Products from the European Communities and Canada–Aircraft, the Appel-
late Body indicated a strong preference for a market price analysis.262 
Therefore, the test frequently used is whether the financial contribu-
tion is one that a recipient would not have received under market con-
ditions. 
 Evaluating whether the disputed measures, particularly feed-in tar-
iffs that guarantee electricity prices, confer a benefit is arduous, be-
                                                                                                                      
255 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶ 2.180. 
256 See, e.g., Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 5.159–.166. 
257 See Canada–Aircraft, supra note 185, ¶ 157. 
258 See ASCM, supra note 45, art. 1.1; Canada–Aircraft, supra note 185, ¶ 157. 
259 See ASCM, supra note 45, art. 14. 
260 See id. art. 14(d). 
261 See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products, ¶ 87, WT/DS103/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2001), available at http:// 
goo.gl/v5Ntzl and http://perma.cc/ASF3-W7L7; Appellate Body Report, European Com-
munities–Export Subsidies on Sugar, ¶ 131, WT/DS265/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005), available at 
http://goo.gl/oqPLds and http://perma.cc/Y3Z7-UK3B. 
262 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain 
Products from the European Communities, ¶¶ 96, 98, 99, 102, WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002) 
(quoting Canada–Aircraft, supra note 185, ¶ 157), available at http://goo.gl/Z6iRTq and 
http://perma.cc/7XXJ-CRMT (“In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for 
comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’ . . . .”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
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cause nearly all electricity generation and consumption in the renewa-
ble energy sector occurs internally and is supported by government 
legislation, whether in China, Canada, the EU, or India.263 In many 
countries, energy markets are distorted in one form or another.264 Most 
countries provide some form of support to their renewable energy sec-
tor or provide subsidies to other energy sectors, such as fossil fuel or 
nuclear energy producers.265 It is therefore difficult to evaluate objec-
tively whether and how much a private investor would have invested, or 
to determine a price absent government subsidy.266 
 The WTO Panel in the Canada RES dispute recognized this prob-
lem.267 To resolve the issue, the Panel applied the Appellate Body deci-
sion in U.S.–Softwood Lumber IV in which the Appellate Body found that 
where a government had a “predominant” role in determining sale 
prices for private suppliers, that price could not serve as a benchmark 
for determining whether a benefit or “more than adequate compensa-
tion” was conferred.268 At the same time, the Panel determined that so 
long as government intervention did not render the application of Ar-
ticle 14 “circular,” a pure or perfect marketplace was not essential to 
making a “benefits” determination.269 
 The Panel in Canada–Feed-In Tariffs therefore adopted the follow-
ing benchmark to make a “benefits” determination: “whether the rates 
of return associated with the FIT and microFIT Contracts [were] signif-
icantly above the average cost of capital in Canada for projects having a 
comparable risk profile.”270 In assessing whether the capital costs were 
higher, the Panel refused to consider the wholesale price in Canada or 
                                                                                                                      
263 See supra notes 210–241 and accompanying text. 
264 See, e.g., European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Making the Internal Energy Market Work 2–7 
(2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012: 
0663:FIN:EN:PDF and http://perma.cc/PE3M-C64N (noting that policies of individual 
EU member states are hindering establishment of open and transparent markets); Cana-
da–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.283 (noting that governments and regu-
lators frequently intervene in energy markets to ensure price stability). 
265 See, e.g., Ghosh & Gangania, supra note 67, at 1 (estimating that leading econo-
mies spend $400 billion to $600 billion annually on fossil fuel subsidies, and noting that 
subsidies for renewable energy totaled roughly $66 billion in 2010). 
266 See infra notes 267–283 and accompanying text. 
267 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 7.276–.292 (analyzing 
whether Ontario’s FIT program constituted a benefit by examining Ontario’s wholesale 
energy market). 
268 Id. ¶ 7.274. 
269 Id. ¶ 7.274–.275, ¶ 7.309. 
270 Id. ¶ 7.324. 
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other jurisdictions from which Canada imported electricity, such as 
New York, Alberta, and New England.271 It also refused to consider the 
risk premium for comparable energy projects such as nuclear and hy-
droelectricity, unless complainants produced additional data and inves-
tigation reports.272 Applying the benchmark as it were, the Panel found 
that complainants had not produced sufficient evidence to establish 
that OGEA conferred a benefit on producers.273 Thus, it found that 
Canada’s price support was not a subsidy under ASCM.274 
 The Panel’s reasoning on the applicable benchmark is unpersua-
sive for two reasons. First, although the market price assessment prob-
lem in this RES dispute is similar to that in U.S.–Softwood Lumber IV, the 
benchmark applied is vastly different.275 In U.S.–Softwood Lumber IV, the 
Appellate Body rejected Canada’s contention that only “private prices” 
in the country providing a financial contribution could be consid-
ered.276 The Appellate Body found that other methods could be used if 
“private prices in that country are distorted because of the govern-
ment’s predominant role in providing those goods.”277 In the Canada–
Feed-In Tariffs dispute, the Panel essentially rejected any such alternative 
market price on the ground that no market price free of government 
intervention existed in any market, even though Canada did not oppose 
complainants’ argument to consider the market prices in in other mar-
kets, such as New York.278 
 Considering the Panel’s conclusion, the Panel should have used 
the second test to determine whether a benefit was conferred, namely 
whether the contribution reduced the cost of production.279 As a dis-
senting Panel member noted, “facilitating the entry of certain technol-
ogies into the market that does exist—such as it is—by way of a finan-
                                                                                                                      
271 Id. ¶ 7.310. 
272 Id. ¶ 7.326. 
273 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.327. 
274 Id. ¶ 7.328. 
275 Compare Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 7.300–.310, with 
U.S.–Softwood Lumber, supra note 185, ¶ 90. 
276 U.S.–Softwood Lumber, supra note 185, ¶¶ 78–79, ¶ 119. 
277 Id. ¶ 90. 
278 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 7.300–.310 (noting that out-
side markets mentioned by complainants, and not challenged by Canada, were not capable 
on their own of providing adequate compensation to generators). 
279 The Appellate Body agreed that the Panel’s benefit analysis was too narrow. See 
Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶¶ 5.212–.220 (concluding that the Panel 
should have considered other benchmarks when analyzing whether a benefit existed). 
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cial contribution can itself be considered to confer a benefit.”280 Cana-
da’s admission that solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power operators 
would not be in a position to enter the traditional wholesale market 
without the price guarantees signals that the government conferred a 
benefit as defined by Article 1.1 of ASCM.281 The majority Panel, how-
ever, did not consider these factors.282 The decision therefore fails to 
provide convincing reasons for its finding that complainants have not 
established that a benefit was conferred.283 
 Furthermore, the Panel decision does not promote RES and can 
in no way be construed as a positive interpretation for purposes of cli-
mate change mitigation efforts. Even though the Panel decided that 
ASCM was not triggered, it found that the domestic content use condi-
tion violated GATT III:4 and TRIMs Article 2.1.284 The Appellate Body 
upheld the Panel on these points.285 The decision has prompted Cana-
da to bring OGEA in compliance with the two WTO laws by scaling 
back the domestic content requirement.286 
 The Panel’s decision essentially requires the Ontario government 
to pursue unilateral action to reduce emissions, which triggers con-
cerns about competitiveness. As Canada pointed out, the feed-in tariff 
(FIT) program aims to promote renewable energy to compensate for 
an anticipated energy deficit due to the closure of coal power plants by 
2014 and nuclear energy maintenance.287 Seemingly, the domestic con-
tent use requirement was an effort to stimulate investments in green 
                                                                                                                      
280 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 9.3 (dissenting opinion of one 
member of the panel). 
281 See id. ¶ 9.23. 
282 See id. ¶¶ 7.320–.327 (majority opinion) (holding complainants’ alternative 
benchmarks for determining a benefit to be inadequate, and observing that a better 
benchmark might be a comparison between relevant rates of return of the challenged 
contracts and relevant average cost of capital in Canada.) 
283 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶¶ 5.219 (reversing the Panel’s 
findings that complainants had failed to establish a benefit). The Appellate Body, however, 
could not determine whether the challenged measures conferred a benefit. Id. ¶ 5.246. 
Ontario has agreed to comply with the Panel decision. See Memorandum from the Minister 
of Energy to Colin Andersen, Chief Executive Officer, Ontario Power Authority (Aug. 16, 
2013), available at http://powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/page/DirectionAd- 
ministrativeMatters-renewables-Aug16-2013.pdf and http://perma.cc/LBY2-GXXS [here-
inafter Ontario Memorandum] (noting that the Ministry intends to bring the FIT program 
into compliance with the WTO decision by reducing domestic content requirements). 
284 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.167. 
285 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs AB Report, supra note 58, ¶ 5.85. 
286 See Ontario Memorandum, supra note 283. 
287 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.216, ¶ 7.322. 
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energy to mitigate the impacts of such closures.288 If that incentive is 
removed, the future of FIT might be jeopardized. The decision will 
therefore test Ontario’s commitment to renewable energy. 
 To the extent that support for OGEA wanes due to the removal of 
a domestic content use requirement—after all, the question would then 
revert back to using taxpayer money to fund price guarantees without 
any other economic benefit—the Panel’s decision will affect renewable 
energy production and thus hinder climate change mitigation ef-
forts.289 Such an outcome contradicts the Panel’s own reason for reject-
ing the complainants’ argument that absent the Ontario government’s 
FIT program, producers would have to compete in a competitive 
wholesale market, that is, “a system that pursues human health and envi-
ronmental objectives through the inclusion of facilities using solar PV 
and wind technologies into the supply-mix” could not be achieved 
without FITs.290 Undeniably, the importance of FITs and similar 
measures to promote renewable energy and climate change mitigation 
is well-recognized. Indeed, one of the Greek laws challenged by China 
in its dispute against the European Union (EU) states climate change 
mitigation as a desired objective of the measure,291 as does India’s 
NSM.292 
 Therefore, even though disputants have not raised an environ-
mental defense to date, if their ability to provide subsidies that promote 
renewable energy and climate change mitigation, in a way that also ad-
dresses competition concerns, is limited by WTO law, countries are like-
ly to consider the applicability of environmental exceptions to sustain 
these measures.293 As the discussion below (in the context of ASCM and 
TRIMs) demonstrates, however, the environmental aspects of the prob-
                                                                                                                      
288 See Wilke, supra note 225 (“Ontario on its part introduced the local content re-
quirement with the aim of attracting foreign investment and creating jobs by spurring 
domestic demand for green energy products.”). 
289 See Ontario Memorandum, supra note 283. 
290 Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.309. 
291 See Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States–
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector, ¶ 5(i), WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012), 
available at http://goo.gl/W1qLlX and http://perma.cc/5LAF-59TQ. The law is titled 
“Accelerating the development of renewable energy sources to Combat Climate Change 
and other provisions relating to the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate 
Change.” Id. 
292 See Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Mission Statement, Gov’t of India, http:// 
www.mnre.gov.in/solar-mission/jnnsm/mission-document-3 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014), availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/Q662-LL7Y. 
293 See Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 47 (noting that Article XX exceptions may 
apply to subsidies, and that such an application might be desirable from a policy stand-
point). 
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lem cannot be addressed under the current WTO treaty framework, 
even if the matter were scrutinized from a “trade and environment” 
lens.294 
B. RES Do Not Qualify for GATT Article XX(b) and (g) Exceptions 
 This section analyzes the scope and limits of applying GATT Arti-
cle XX exceptions to RES. Even though Canada did not invoke an Arti-
cle XX environmental exception, as proposed by at least one amicus 
curie brief, this section refers to the Canada–Feed-In Tariffs dispute to 
demonstrate that Article XX exceptions to RES challenges cannot be 
sustained under ASCM or TRIMs, even though the latter specifically 
recognizes GATT exceptions.295 This analysis seeks to inform the gen-
eral discussion on applying Article XX to climate change disputes and 
highlight the need for meaningful international climate treaty ac-
tion.296 
 If environmental exceptions were applied to address prohibited 
subsidies, such as domestic content or export restriction subsidies, two 
preliminary issues must be addressed to extend Article XX exceptions: 
(1) regarding ASCM, whether Article XX general exceptions can apply 
to ASCM, and (2) regarding ASCM and TRIMs, whether the subsidies 
qualify for an Article XX exception. Each issue is considered below. 
1. Applying Article XX Exceptions to ASCM Disputes 
 ASCM provides a narrow environmental exception, which has now 
expired.297 Unlike other specific WTO Agreements, notably TRIMs, 
ASCM does not incorporate Article XX exceptions.298 Nevertheless, 
scholars have argued that Article XX should apply to ASCM disputes.299 
                                                                                                                      
294 See infra notes 297–317 and accompanying text. 
295 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 3; Canada Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 
235; Simon Lester, GATT Article XX, Environmental Measures, and the SCM Agreement, Int’l 
Econ. L. Blog (Aug. 29, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/ 
trade_and_environment, available at http://perma.cc/RC6K-V6UM. 
296 See infra notes 295–402 and accompanying text. 
297 See ASCM, supra note 45, art. 8.2(c). 
298 Compare id. arts. 8.1–8.5 (listing non-actionable subsidies, with no reference to 
GATT), with TRIMs Agreement, supra note 46, art. 3 (“All exceptions under GATT 1994 
shall apply, as appropriate, to the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
299 Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 47 (“[T]here are no decisive legal obstacles to 
the application of GATT Article XX to climate change subsidies . . . this move may be poli-
cy-wise desirable.”); Christopher Tran, Using GATT, Art XX to Justify Climate Change Measures 
in Claims Under the WTO Agreement, 27 Envtl. & Plan. L. Rev. 346, 355–56 (2010) (“An-
other option, potentially open on the current agreements, is to invoke GATT, Art XX to 
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This subsection argues that GATT Article XX exceptions cannot apply 
to ASCM disputes. 
 According to the GATT General Interpretative Note to Annex IA, 
in case of conflict between GATT and a specific WTO Agreement, the 
specific agreement prevails over GATT to the extent of that conflict.300 
A conflict exists when two provisions cannot be respected simultaneous-
ly. Absent a conflict, a matter would first be addressed under the specif-
ic agreement, and then by the relevant GATT provisions.301 
 Arguments for extending Article XX exceptions to ASCM empha-
size the close linkage between GATT and ASCM.302 Although the 
ASCM does not specifically refer to Article XX, it also does not specifi-
cally exclude the application of Article XX.303 Thus, Article XX is a “fall 
back” to ASCM provisions.304 This argument implicitly assumes that 
there will be no conflict in applying the general and specific agree-
ments. 
 There is indeed no general conflict between the two relevant treaty 
provisions—GATT Article XX(b) and (g) and ASCM Article 8.2(c). 
Both allow WTO Members to deviate from their treaty obligations for 
environmental reasons.305 The scope of the two provisions is different, 
however, and therefore cannot be read interchangeably, or even in con-
junction. 
 Under ASCM Article 8.2, Members could only provide a one-time 
assistance of up to twenty percent to existing facilities to adapt to new 
environmental regulation that was directly linked to reducing the pol-
                                                                                                                      
justify SCM inconsistency—an argument slowly coming to prominence among commenta-
tors.”). 
300 General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/05-anx1a_e.htm and http://perma.cc/GY69-CTLE 
(“In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 and a provision of another [Annex 1A] agreement . . . the provision of the 
other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.”). 
301 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 7.14–
.16, WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002), available at http://goo.gl/qRTlIC and http://perma. 
cc/8UAW-5VMZ (“[A] panel should normally consider the more specific agreement be-
fore the more general agreement.”). 
302 See Canada Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 235, ¶¶ 25–30 (pointing to numerous 
references in ASCM to GATT and arguing that the specific subsidies agreement is drawn 
from GATT 1994); Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 40 (noting that the ASCM is directly 
connected to the GATT, and that the WTO is a single undertaking with integrated legal 
provisions). 
303 Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 40. 
304 Id. at 9–13. 
305 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b), art. XX(g); ASCM, supra note 45, art. 8.2(c). 
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lution.306 Members could not provide assistance towards manufacturing 
and replacement costs, and had to extend the benefit to all enterprises 
that had to adapt to new production process or equipment.307 ASCM 
provides a narrow and specific environmental exception, unlike Article 
XX(b) and (g), which provide broader exceptions, for protecting 
health or conserving an exhaustible natural resource.308 If drafters in-
tended to provide such an expansive exception under ASCM, they 
could have either specifically incorporated GATT exceptions, as in the 
case of TRIMs, or at least not provided a limited exception, but they did 
not.309 
 Furthermore, the expiration of ASCM environmental exceptions 
shows that WTO Members intended to end all exceptions to actionable 
or prohibited subsidies.310 Creating an exception for subsidies under 
Article XX would run contrary to such an intent. Thus, applying GATT 
Article XX to ASCM subsidies would conflict with the terms of ASCM. 
Therefore, according to GATT Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, the 
specific agreement should prevail, and an environmental exception 
cannot be applied to prohibited subsidies, even if they promote renew-
able energy and ultimately climate change mitigation.311 
 The question then becomes whether the environmental exception 
to ASCM should be revived. Reviving the exception, however, would not 
solve the problem of prohibited subsidies. For example, even if ASCM 
Article 8.2 were current, OGEA would not qualify because it does not 
primarily impose new environmental requirements, but instead pro-
motes a new energy source with a general objective of achieving climate 
change mitigation.312 OGEA is generally only an effort to diversify On-
tario’s energy mix to provide energy while maintaining nuclear facili-
ties, and to reduce emissions.313 Moreover, some of the subsidies ex-
ceed the twenty-percent limit and are being provided on a continuing 
                                                                                                                      
306 ASCM, supra note 45, arts. 8.2(c)(i)–(ii), 8.2(c)(iv). 
307 Id. arts. 8.2(c)(iii)–(v). 
308 Compare GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b), art. XX(g), with ASCM, supra note 45, art. 
8.2(c). 
309 Cf. Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 40 (noting that ASCM provisions on non-
actionable subsidies were allowed to expire in 1999). 
310 Id. 
311 For a contrary view, see id. at 40 (arguing that GATT art. XX can apply to ASCM 
disputes because the environmental exception covered by the two are distinct and because 
ASCM does not explicitly state that GATT art. XX does not apply). 
312 See Wilke, supra note 225 (noting that Ontario’s FIT program was intended to spur 
investments in green energy). 
313 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.216, ¶ 7.322. 
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basis and not as a one-time assistance.314 It is equally doubtful that do-
mestic content use requirement is necessary for a firm to install new 
equipment or adapt to new production processes.315 The issue of creat-
ing an environmental exception is perhaps one that requires the atten-
tion of WTO Members, but the mere absence of an exception is an in-
sufficient reason to extend Article XX exceptions to ASCM. 
 Moreover, applying Article XX to ASCM is contrary to Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: “A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”316 
 An ordinary interpretation of ASCM in light of the limited envi-
ronmental exception and its expiry is that Article 8.2 served a specific 
objective, which was to allow a certain amount of subsidies for a limited 
time to assist enterprises to adapt to new environmental regulations. 
Applying GATT Article XX(b) or (g) would also expand the scope of 
the environmental exception beyond the limitations set out in Article 
8.2, because they are more expansive in nature and do not impose re-
strictions on the amount or number of times when financial assistance 
may be granted.317 Applying GATT environmental exceptions would 
also extend the application of an exception beyond the specified time 
period explicitly stipulated in ASCM. Therefore, Article 31 of the Vien-
na Convention does not support an interpretation extending GATT 
Article XX exceptions to ASCM subsidies. 
 Even if Article XX exceptions were to apply to ASCM, subsidies 
can be found to be valid only if they satisfy the requirements under Ar-
ticle XX. As discussed below, RES do not meet the Article XX excep-
tions and are therefore normatively undesirable. 
2. Whether RES Qualify for Article XX Exceptions 
 WTO Members can claim exceptions under GATT Article XX(b) 
and (g) if three requirements are satisfied: (1) the measure must fall 
within the subject matter of the exception, (2) the measure must be 
                                                                                                                      
314 See id. ¶¶ 7.64–65 (noting that under the FIT program, Ontario pays a guaranteed 
price for electricity under twenty- or forty-year contracts, for as long as the electricity is 
delivered). 
315 Notably, Ontario intends to continue the FIT program without the domestic use 
requirement. See Ontario Memorandum, supra note 283. 
316 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691–92 (1969). 
317 Compare GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b), art. XX(g), with ASCM, supra note 45, 
art. 8.2(c). 
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necessary or relating to the subject matter, and (3) the measure must 
conform to the chapeau to Article XX.318 As discussed below, even if 
Article XX were to extend to ASCM,319 or TRIMs, sustaining claims and 
applying the exceptions in relation to RES will be difficult for doctrinal 
and normative reasons. 
a. Article XX(b) 
 Under GATT Article XX(b), WTO Members can take measures 
that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”320 
Each component must be satisfied, namely the measure must be neces-
sary and must protect human, animal, or plant life or health. 
 i. Disputed RES Can Protect Human, Animal, or Plant Life or 
Health (HAP Life or Health) 
 An argument for applying Article XX(b) to a disputed RES is that 
such subsidies are intended to mitigate climate change, which presents 
a risk to HAP life or health. According to EC–Asbestos, a panel, as trier 
of fact, may consider scientific evidence in assessing whether a risk to 
HAP exists.321 The Panel in EC–Asbestos consulted scientific experts and 
studies published by international bodies in making its determination 
that asbestos presented a risk to HAP.322 
 Contrary views notwithstanding, a majority of scientists agree that 
climate change presents a risk to HAP life or health. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate change 
can be considered as a risk to HAP life and health because it is predict-
                                                                                                                      
318 See Panel Report, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, ¶ 5.12 ( June 
1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted); Panel Report, United States–Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, ¶ 6.20 ( Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter 
U.S.–Gasoline], available at http://goo.gl/w8iPU and http://perma.cc/9Z9G-T3LC. 
319 See Jegou & Rubini, supra note 68, at 38–41 (arguing for the application of Article 
XX exceptions to ASCM in the context of allocating free allowances). 
320 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b). 
321 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 163–66, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC–
Asbestos], available at http://goo.gl/ycnO8W and http://perma.cc/R5G9-7R5S. In this 
dispute, the Government of France imposed trade embargos on goods that contained 
asbestos fibres to protect the health and safety of workers handling such products. Canada 
challenged the Decree on several grounds, and the EC successfully defended the measure 
under Article XX(b). Id. ¶¶ 1–4. In deciding Canada’s appeal, the Appellate Body af-
firmed the Panel’s finding and found that the Panel had the discretion to evaluate scien-
tific evidence, and that the Appellate Body would only intervene if it found that the Panel 
had abused its discretion. Id. ¶ 162. 
322 Id. ¶ 162. 
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ed to cause sea-level rise that can destroy property, increase disease 
outbreaks, and endanger human life.323 Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledge, 
in its Preamble, that climate change presents risks to HAP life or 
health.324 RES also fall within the subject matter covered by Article 
XX(b) because renewable energy will help reduce CO2 emissions by 
supplanting fossil fuels that produce CO2, thereby mitigating climate 
change and helping to protect HAP life or health.325 
 Unless persuasive evidence to the contrary is produced and con-
sidered favorably by a Panel,326 it is unlikely that a WTO dispute settle-
ment body would disagree that climate change presents risks to HAP 
life or health. A claimant, however, must also establish that the measure 
was necessary.327 
 ii. Export Subsidies and Domestic Content Use Do Not Meet the 
“Necessary” Criteria 
 Applying GATT Article XX(b) hinges on the question of whether 
prohibited subsidies under ASCM (subsidies conditioned on export 
performance or domestic content use) or subsidies that violate TRIMs 
(those that impose restrictions on domestic content) are necessary to 
mitigate climate change and protect risks to HAP life or health. 
 For a measure to be considered necessary under Article XX(b), 
“alternative measures either consistent or less inconsistent” with GATT 
should not be available.328 An alternative measure should be reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
323 Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Ad-
aptation and Vulnerability 7–22 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf. 
324 UNFCCC, supra note 7, Preamble (acknowledging that the adverse effects of cli-
mate change are a “common concern of human kind” and expressing concern that in-
creased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere “may adversely affect natural ecosystems 
and humankind.”). Article 1(1) defines adverse effects of climate change as “changes in 
the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant 
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed 
ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and wel-
fare.” Id. art. 1(1). 
325 See supra notes 148–175 and accompanying text. 
326 As the Appellate Body noted in EC–Asbestos, governments could act in good faith on 
the basis of “divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.” EC–Asbestos, 
supra note 321, ¶ 178 (citing Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶ 194, WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998)). 
327 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b); see infra notes 328–338 and accompanying text. 
328 See U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶ 6.24; EC–Asbestos, supra note 321, ¶¶ 171–175 
(declining to reverse the Panel holding on the “necessary” standard under Article XX(b)). 
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and not impossible to implement, but mere administrative difficulties 
will not render an alternative unreasonable.329 According to the Appel-
late Body, “‘[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or 
values’ pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures 
designed to achieve those ends.”330 
 RES that catalyze energy reforms promote climate change mitiga-
tion by reducing the cost of renewable equipment or encouraging in-
vestment in renewable energy.331 Export performance and domestic 
content use-based subsides, however, are not necessary to promote cli-
mate change mitigation.332 Although RES can promote climate change 
mitigation, attaching conditions such as domestic content require-
ments suggests that market capture and protectionism are the primary 
objectives of the subsidies.333 Such objectives undermine common goals 
and values of market access under WTO law.334 
 Moreover, reasonable alternatives to mitigate climate change, oth-
er than imposing domestic content requirements, are available. For 
example, countries could provide subsidies without imposing domestic 
content or export performance requirements.335 They could also pur-
sue climate change mitigation action under the Kyoto Protocol.336 For 
example, China could accept legally binding emissions obligations and, 
pursuant to the same, decommission coal power plants instead of ex-
panding its coal capability.337 Canada and the EU could unilaterally re-
                                                                                                                      
The Appellate Body also referred to other arguments made by Canada in this regard, in-
cluding the quantification of the risk and the level of risk as determined by France. The 
Appellate Body addressed the arguments in the context of the test for protecting HAP life 
or health, however, and also noted that France could choose to regulate high risks but 
permit products that presented a low risk of cancer. Id. ¶¶ 164–168. 
329 EC–Asbestos, supra note 321, ¶ 169. 
330 Id. ¶ 172 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000)). 
331 See Nancy Pfund & Ben Healey, Should the Government Subsidize Alternative Energy?, Yale 
School of Mgmt. (Dec. 2011), http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/should-government-
subsidize-alternative-energy, available at http://perma.cc/WR3S-WAVY. 
332 See infra notes 336–340 and accompanying text. 
333 See, e.g., Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 7.7, 8.5, 8.9 (affirm-
ing the complaint that the domestic use requirement was a form of WTO-inconsistent 
protection to certain energy producers). 
334 See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 39, at 71 (noting that GATT is designed to facili-
tate exchanges of market access between government). 
335 See, e.g., Ontario Memorandum, supra note 283 (affirming that Ontario will contin-
ue its FIT program while drastically scaling back its domestic use requirement). 
336 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 12, 17. 
337 See Key Energy Statistics, supra note 152, at 14 (showing historical growth in 
Chinese coal production); Moser, supra note 27, at 677 (noting the fast-growing demand 
for coal in China). 
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duce existing tariffs on renewable energy equipment to reduce the cost 
of electricity. At a national level, Canada could monitor its expansive tar 
sands production, which is allegedly contributing to an increase in 
emissions and is currently subject to regulation by the EU, despite Can-
ada’s protests.338 All of these are reasonable alternatives. The existence 
of reasonable alternatives indicates that conditional RES are not neces-
sary to protect HAP life and health. 
b. Article XX(g) 
 GATT Article XX(g) creates an exception for measures “relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures 
are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”339 The necessary elements to invoke an Article XX(g) 
exception are therefore: (1) the measure should aim to conserve ex-
haustible natural resources, (2) the measure should be related to the 
conservation goal, and (3) the measure should be made in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production and consumption. 
i. RES Are Aimed at Conserving Exhaustible Natural Resources 
 WTO dispute settlement bodies have ruled that the term “natural 
resource” is evolutionary, especially considering the goal of sustainable 
development incorporated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agree-
ment.340 According to the Appellate Body, in U.S.–Shrimp the term “ex-
haustible natural resource” now encompasses both living and non-
living resources.341 The key question is whether exhaustible natural re-
sources would be conserved by RES. 
 To the extent that RES promote climate change mitigation, they 
promote the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The Earth’s 
atmosphere is conserved by maintaining its greenhouse gas (GHG) 
                                                                                                                      
338 See Arthur Neslen, EU Faces Down Tar Sands Industry, EurActiv.com, http://www. 
euractiv.com/climate-environment/eu-faces-tar-sands-industry-news-508140 (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/QRK5-MEZ4. 
339 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(g). 
340 Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.–Shrimp], available at 
http://goo.gl/9lG10t and http://perma.cc/Z7PN-R5NT. 
341 Id. ¶ 131. 
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balance, and the Earth’s living and non-living exhaustible natural re-
sources, which are threatened by climate change, are also conserved.342 
 The Panel decision in U.S.–Gasoline supports the proposition that 
the Earth’s atmosphere is an exhaustible natural resource.343 In that 
case, the United States defended Clean Air Act regulations to control 
ozone pollution from vehicles on the premise that clean air was an ex-
haustible natural resource.344 In particular, the United States contend-
ed that certain pollutants could exhaust the air quality, if they persisted 
over a long time period.345 
 The WTO Panel agreed that “clean air was a resource . . . [that] 
could be depleted.”346 The Panel rejected the argument that clean air 
was not exhaustible because it could be renewed.347 Instead, the Panel 
compared clean air to resources such as renewable stocks of salmon, 
which an earlier Panel had considered as an exhaustible natural re-
source.348 A capacity for renewal did not render the resource non-
exhaustible.349 The Panel found that “a policy to reduce the depletion 
of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).”350 The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Panel in U.S.–Gasoline that renewability does 
not render a resource inexhaustible.351 Thus, living resources such as 
turtles that could reproduce were nevertheless considered exhaustible, 
without appropriate intervention.352 
                                                                                                                      
342 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 33, at 7, 18–20 
(noting the environmental benefits of renewable energy, including climate change mitiga-
tion through reduced GHG emissions). 
343 See U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶¶ 6.36–.37. 
344 Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 3.59. 
345 Id. ¶ 3.59. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel decision on other grounds. Ap-
pellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 29, 
WT/DS2/9 (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.–Gasoline AB Report], available at http://goo. 
gl/LyRVwh and http://perma.cc/DNB5-32HW. The complainants did not appeal, and the 
Appellate Body did not address, the Panel’s decision that clean air was an exhaustible nat-
ural resource. See id. at 14–19. 
346 U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶ 6.37. 
347 Id. (“[T]he fact that a resource was renewable could not be an objection.”). 
348 Id. (citing Panel Report, Canada–Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon, ¶ 4.4 (Mar. 22, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) [hereinafter Canada–Herring 
and Salmon]). 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 128 (“We do not believe that ‘exhaustible’ natural re-
sources and ‘renewable’ natural resources are mutually exclusive.”). 
352 See id. ¶ 134. 
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 The Earth’s atmosphere is likewise exhaustible.353 The atmosphere, 
which contains naturally occurring GHGs such as carbon dioxide, is a 
non-living resource. The proper functioning of the Earth’s atmosphere 
depends on the relative stability and balance in its composition.354 If the 
atmospheric composition and balance is disturbed, the atmospheric 
support system will be compromised, as projected by scientists.355 An 
unstable atmosphere threatens life and property on Earth.356 
  Even though several natural factors affect the atmospheric com-
position, few are as threatening to the atmosphere as anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs.357 Like anthropogenic emissions of chlorofluoro-
carbons, which compromised the ability of the ozone layer to protect 
life on Earth, anthropogenic GHG emissions, such as carbon dioxide, 
are projected to diminish the optimal functioning of the Earth’s at-
mosphere.358 Thus, the Earth’s atmosphere is an exhaustible natural 
resource under Article XX(g). 
 Similarly, support exists for the proposition that conserving the 
Earth’s atmosphere conserves several living and non-living natural re-
sources that are threatened by climate change.359 As the United States 
argued in U.S.–Gasoline, poor air quality could exhaust natural re-
sources such as “lakes, streams, parks, crops, and forests,” and thus 
measures to conserve air quality constitute measures to conserve ex-
haustible natural resources under Article XX(g).360 The depletion of 
the Earth’s atmospheric balance threatens to exhaust a range of natural 
                                                                                                                      
353 See U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶¶ 6.36–.37. 
354 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report 37 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ 
ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
355 See id. (noting that changes in the atmospheric concentration of GHGs and aero-
sols drive climate change). 
356 See, e.g., Climate Impacts on Society, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/climate 
change/impacts-adaptation/society.html#Economic (last visited Jan. 7, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/5ZFH-EBEN. 
357 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 354, at 37–54 
(projecting future climate change due to anthropogenic GHG emissions, and listing po-
tential negative effects for human health and the stability of the ecosystem). 
358 See id. at 44–54 (projecting impacts of climate change under various emissions sce-
narios). 
359 See generally Gian-Reto Walther, Community and Ecosystem Responses to Recent Climate 
Change, 365 Phil. Transactions of the Royal Soc’y of London B: Biological Scienc-
es 2019 (2010) (listing adverse effects of climate change on animal species, water ecosys-
tems, and forest ecosystems). 
360 U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶ 6.36. 
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resources.361 According to the IPCC, climate change is a threat to natu-
ral ecosystems and species, among other resources.362 The loss of at-
mospheric balance is predicted to cause severe weather-related events 
that can unleash catastrophic consequences, including loss of agricul-
tural productivity, which is essential for life on Earth.363 Consequently, a 
measure to conserve the Earth’s atmosphere is a measure to conserve 
exhaustible natural resources.364 
 Therefore, to the extent that RES promote climate change mitiga-
tion efforts by conserving the Earth’s atmosphere, upon which other 
exhaustible and non-living resources rely, RES satisfy the Article XX(g) 
requirement that a measure conserves exhaustible natural resources.365 
ii. RES Are Not “Related to” the Conservation Goal 
 The second requirement to apply GATT Article XX(g) is that a 
measure must be “related to” the conservation goal, which in this case 
means climate change mitigation.366 According to WTO Appellate 
Body decisions, to satisfy this requirement the measure should be “pri-
marily aimed at” conservation,367 and “[t]he means . . . in principle, 
[must be] reasonably related to the ends.”368“ Specifically, there must 
be a “relationship between the general structure and design of the 
measure . . . and the policy goal . . . [of] conservation . . . .”369 Thus, to 
qualify for an Article XX(g) exception, RES must be primarily aimed at 
or have a close relationship to climate change mitigation. 
 As in U.S.–Gasoline, RES are reasonably related to the goal of con-
serving natural resources because they promote renewable energy, 
which aids climate change efforts, which in turn will enable conserva-
                                                                                                                      
361 See generally Walther, supra note 359 (documenting the effects of climate change on 
several ecological networks). 
362 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 354, at 8–12. 
363 Id. at 17–18. 
364 See, e.g., U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶¶ 6.36–.37 (holding that clean air is an ex-
haustible natural resource); U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶¶ 132–134 (holding endangered 
sea turtles to be an exhaustible natural resource). 
365 See supra notes 340–364 and accompanying text. 
366 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(g). 
367 U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 318, ¶ 6.39 (citing to Canada–Herring and Salmon, supra 
note 348). 
368 U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 141. The Appellate Body found a “substantial” rela-
tionship between U.S. law aimed at protecting endangered sea turtles and the larger policy 
of conserving a natural resource. Id. 
369 Id. ¶ 137. 
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tion of natural resources.370 The WTO Panel’s observation in Canada–
Feed-In Tariff—that it would be difficult to pursue human health and 
environmental objectives when generating electricity, without govern-
ment intervention to add solar PV and wind technologies into the 
mix—also supports the argument that there is a nexus between RES 
and the goal of conservation of exhaustible natural resources.371 
 The argument, however, is untenable when RES are conditioned 
on export performance or domestic content use because they are then 
not narrowly defined to serve the conservation goal.372 Additionally, 
conditional subsidies are not “primarily aimed” at the conservation 
goal, because (1) the conservation goal can be achieved by providing 
unconditional subsidies, and (2) there is no “genuine relationship” be-
tween the conditional subsidies and the conservation of natural re-
sources.373 Prohibited subsidies or conditions that violate TRIMs might 
help conserve natural resources via climate change mitigation, but 
their primary goals appear to be interfering with market access and 
protecting domestic industry.374 This conclusion is almost inescapable 
given that the countries involved in RES disputes have rejected Kyoto 
Protocol obligations and/or continue to invest in fossil fuel energy re-
sources: Canada, China and India are not bound by Kyoto Protocol 
emissions reduction obligations, and coal imports are on the upswing 
in China, India, and the EU.375 Therefore, by their structure and de-
sign, conditional RES are not “related” to the conservation goal articu-
lated in Article XX(g).376 
                                                                                                                      
370 See U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 14–19 (holding that U.S. regulation of 
gasoline was reasonably related to the goal of conservation of clean air). 
371 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶ 7.309. 
372 Cf. U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶¶ 135–142 (holding that a disputed trade measure 
regulating shrimp harvesting was narrow enough to “relate to” conservation of a natural 
resource, because it only regulated harvesting practices that threatened endangered sea 
turtles). 
373 See supra notes 331–338 and accompanying text. 
374 See, e.g., Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 7.7, 8.5, 8.9 (affirm-
ing complaint that domestic use requirement was a form of WTO-inconsistent protection 
to certain energy producers). 
375 See Corina Haita, International Center for Climate Governance, The State 
of Compliance in the Kyoto Protocol 2 (2012) (stating that “China and India do not 
have commitment targets within the Kyoto Protocol”); COP 16, supra note 1, at 6 (noting 
that Canada has rejected further emissions targets); Peter Galuszka, With China and India 
Ravenous for Energy, Coal’s Future Seems Assured, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2012, at B6 (noting 
increased demand for coal in China, and noting that Europe and India are increasing coal 
imports). 
376 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(g). 
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 iii. RES Are Not Made in Conjunction with Restriction on Domes-
tic Production 
 According to the Appellate Body decision in U.S.–Gasoline, a 
measure or restriction must be even-handed—it must also apply to do-
mestic production and consumption.377 In both U.S.–Gasoline and U.S.–
Shrimp, the WTO dispute settlement bodies found that the measures in 
question, gasoline standards and trawling regulation, respectively, were 
even-handed because the measures regulated both domestic and for-
eign producers.378 
 Since RES are not active measures that impose restrictions such as 
compliance with gasoline quality or fishing methods, it is difficult to 
construe how the “even-handedness” standard applies. An argument 
can nevertheless be made that the RES fail the test of evenhandedness 
to the extent that they affect foreign producers of associated goods dif-
ferently.379 
 Under the design of RES law and policy, foreign producers can 
lose market access in one of two ways. Export performance-based sub-
sidies restrict access to third-country markets,380 while subsidies condi-
tioned on domestic content use restrict access to markets within the 
subsidizing country.381 For example, one of the key contentions in Chi-
na–Wind and Solar Equipment was that China’s export performance-
based subsidies resulted in the United States losing its access to EU 
markets.382 Likewise, Canada, the EU, and India’s FIT programs in-
crease access to certain goods for domestic producers of renewable en-
ergy equipment, but restrict access to exporters of the same.383 To the 
                                                                                                                      
377 U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 20–21 (“The [Article XX(g)] clause is a 
requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conserva-
tion, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.”); see also 
U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 143. 
378 U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 21; U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 144. 
379 See, e.g., Section 301 Petition, supra note 210, at 45–52 (arguing that China’s export 
restraints failed the test of even-handedness). China has since revoked the disputed law. See 
China Ends Wind Power Subsidies, supra note 54. 
380 See Section 301 Petition, supra note 210, at 11 (“China’s policies have . . . displaced 
U.S. exports to China and to third country markets—affecting trade flows that reached 
$16 billion in 2009.”). 
381 See, e.g., id. at 182–83 (noting that China’s domestic subsidies have restricted U.S. 
access to China’s green technology market); Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra 
note 50, ¶¶ 3.1(a), 3.4(a) (noting complainants’ argument that Ontario’s domestic use 
content subsidy imposed market access restrictions on Japan and the European Union). 
382 See Section 301 Petition, supra note 210, at 11. 
383 See Canada–Feed-In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 3.1(a), 3.4(a); EU–
Renewable Energy, supra note 51, at 3; India–Solar, supra note 52, at 2. 
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extent that these programs treat domestic and foreign producers dif-
ferently, they are not even-handed.384 The disputed RES do not seem to 
meet the third requirement for invoking Article XX(g)—that they be 
made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production.385 
c. Chapeau to Article XX 
 In addition to the specific requirements under each sub-section, 
the chapeau to GATT Article XX must also be satisfied to invoke the 
exceptions.386 Under the chapeau, Article XX exceptions will not apply 
if a measure (1) arbitrarily discriminates between countries where the 
same condition prevails, (2) imposes an unjustifiable trade measure, 
and (3) is a disguised restriction on trade.387 There is no bright line 
test, however, to distinguish “arbitrary discrimination,” “unjustifiable 
discrimination,” and “disguised restriction.”388 As the Appellate Body in 
U.S.–Gasoline noted, they “may . . . be read side-by-side; they impart 
meaning to one another.”389 Any arbitrary or unjustified measure could 
also constitute a disguised trade measure.390 
 The objective of this requirement is to check against an “abuse of 
the exceptions” of Article XX and ensure that a Member does not 
“frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right un-
der the substantive rules of the [GATT] . . . .”391 It also enables a dis-
pute settlement body to ensure that a measure is applied “reasonably, 
with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the ex-
ceptions and the legal rights of the other parties concerned.”392 
                                                                                                                      
384 See U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 20–21. 
385 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(g); U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 20–
21. 
386See, e.g., U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 22 (“In order that the justifying 
protection of Article XX may be extended to [a disputed measure] . . . it must also satisfy 
the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX.”). 
387 Id. at 23; see GATT, supra note 19, art. XX. 
388 U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 23 (noting that the chapeau is not with-
out ambiguity, particularly when considering the standard to be applied in determining 
the existence of the three requirements). 
389 Id. at 25. 
390 Id. 
391 Id. at 22. The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp observed that the chapeau ensured 
that exceptions would be “limited and conditional.” U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 157. 
392 U.S.–Gasoline AB Report, supra note 345, at 22. The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp 
noted that its task was to find a balance “between the right of a Member to invoke an ex-
ception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive 
provisions . . . [so as not to] distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obliga-
tions constructed by the Members themselves.” U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶ 159. 
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 In applying the chapeau, the Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp ob-
served that a policy that was not based on “diplomacy” or international 
consensus, and that had a discriminatory impact, was unjustified.393 
The Appellate Body further observed that the rigid and inflexible ap-
plication of a disputed measure, even when similar economic condi-
tions prevailed, was discriminatory.394 Thus, the U.S. policy of providing 
import permits to importers that used turtle excluder devices, but re-
fusing permits to importers that had comparable, even if different, 
methods for excluding turtles, was found to be discriminatory and un-
justified.395 
 RES that require domestic content use or export performance do 
not satisfy the requirements under the chapeau to Article XX. The 
conditional subsidies are not based on international consensus or di-
plomacy. Although the Kyoto Protocol recognizes renewable energy as 
an important climate mitigation tool, it does not recognize conditional 
subsidies as the means for promoting renewable energy and thus miti-
gating climate change.396 The Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC also em-
phasize that climate mitigation measures should not affect internation-
al trade.397 Moreover, many of the countries involved in the RES 
disputes have rejected Kyoto Protocol obligations, and to that extent 
they are not acting on the basis of international consensus or diploma-
cy.398  The importance given to international consensus in U.S.–Shrimp 
suggests that conditional RES are unjustified and arbitrary under the 
Article XX chapeau.399 
 The RES conditions also have a discriminatory impact and consti-
tute disguised trade measures. In particular, domestic content require-
ments will impact foreign producers of renewable energy equipment, 
because a failure to use domestic goods will result in a loss of market 
access.400 As discussed above, countries can provide financial support to 
firms to promote renewable energy, without imposing any restrictions 
                                                                                                                      
393 U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶¶ 166–167, 176. 
394 Id. ¶ 177. 
395 See id. ¶ 184. 
396 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 2 (encouraging research and development of 
renewable energy, without mentioning subsidies). 
397 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 2(1), 2(3), 3(14); UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 
2, 3, 5. 
398 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
399 See U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 340, ¶¶ 166–167, 176. 
400 See supra notes 210–241 and accompanying text (discussing subsidies with domestic 
content requirements). 
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that impact trade.401 The imposition of domestic content requirements 
as a condition for qualifying government assistance is therefore dis-
criminatory and constitutes a disguised trade measure to the extent 
that it affects market access to certain imports.402 
 Therefore, whether a WTO Member provides subsidies or takes an 
investment measure, the imposition of conditions such as export per-
formance or domestic content requirements cannot qualify for envi-
ronmental exceptions under WTO law, especially absent a cogent in-
ternational treaty framework. 
Conclusion 
 The challenges of resolving conflicts between trade and environ-
mental law and policy are long-standing, and the case of climate 
change mitigation is no exception. The confluence of World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) law and climate mitigation treaties presents unique 
legal challenges, however, as illustrated by a study of the disputed re-
newable energy subsidies (RES). Granting RES to catalyze investment 
in, and use of, renewable energy is a promising means of mitigating 
climate change. Subsidies to equipment manufacturers or energy pro-
ducers in the form of feed-in tariff guarantees could catalyze changes in 
energy consumption behavior and promote greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions reduction. 
 The problem, however, is that some major economies do not view 
RES only as a climate change mitigation strategy. These economies also 
see in RES a unique economic opportunity, be it to capture market ac-
cess or to alleviate competition and leakage concerns associated with 
climate change mitigation efforts, including transitioning from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy technology. To harness this economic oppor-
tunity, countries in the disputed cases have attached conditions for 
beneficiaries to qualify for RES, which are in clear violation of WTO 
law. 
 When countries became WTO Members, they agreed to reduce 
protectionism and facilitate movement of goods across borders through 
                                                                                                                      
401 See supra notes 331–338. For a practical example, see Ontario Memorandum, supra 
note 283 (affirming that Ontario will continue its FIT program while drastically scaling 
back its domestic use requirement). 
402 See, e.g., Section 301 Petition, supra note 210, at 182–83 (noting that China’s domes-
tic subsidies have restricted U.S. access to China’s green technology market); Canada–Feed-
In Tariffs Panel Decision, supra note 50, ¶¶ 3.1(a), 3.4(a) (noting complainants’ argument 
that Ontario’s domestic use content subsidy imposed market access restrictions on Japan 
and the European Union). 
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a series of rules. Those rules, specifically General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) most-favored nation and national treatment provi-
sions, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), govern be-
havior of nations and define the limits within which financial support 
can be provided to domestic industries. Subsidies that violate the rules 
of trade law undermine the commitment to internationally accepted 
rules. Financial assistance conditioned upon domestic content use vio-
lates WTO rules, according to the Panel decision in Canada–Feed-In Tar-
iff. Such assistance also likely violates ASCM, notwithstanding the Pan-
el’s decision in Canada–Feed-In Tariff. 
 The question, then, is whether in the interest of climate change 
mitigation, conditional subsidies can qualify for environmental excep-
tions to WTO rules, under GATT Article XX(b) and (g). Despite the 
importance of RES as a solution to reduce GHG emissions, the condi-
tional subsidies are unlikely to qualify for an environmental exception, 
because WTO exceptions cannot be applied in the abstract. They must 
correlate to the objectives for which such exceptions are carved out in 
WTO rules. Not only should the specific requirements for applying the 
exceptions be satisfied, but also measures pursuant to the exceptions 
should conform to fundamental WTO rules, notably non-discrimination 
and equal treatment. The measures must also be as least trade restrictive 
as possible. Regarding ASCM, there is an additional issue of whether 
GATT Article XX can apply to subsidies, when specific environmental 
exceptions under ASCM have expired. 
 Insofar as ASCM is concerned, applying GATT Article XX envi-
ronmental exceptions would expand the scope of the latter beyond the 
apparent legislative intent and run contrary both to the GATT Inter-
pretative Note, Annex 1A and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Even if one assumes that GATT Article XX exceptions would 
apply to ASCM, as it does to TRIMs, the legal conditions for extending 
the exceptions to the disputed subsidies are not satisfied. 
 Without a doubt, RES promote the objectives for which Article 
XX(b) and (g) exceptions are created, to protect human, animal, and 
plant life and health, and to conserve exhaustible natural resources, 
respectively. Scientific evidence of threats to ecosystems, habitats, and 
general weather conditions supports the proposition that measures to 
mitigate climate change would protect human, animal, and plant life 
and health. Likewise, based on WTO jurisprudence, a case can be 
made for the proposition that the Earth’s atmosphere and the life sys-
tems that it protects are exhaustible natural resources, and thus 
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measures to protect the Earth’s atmosphere constitute measures to 
conserve exhaustible natural resources. 
 As indicated by Article XX(b) and (g), however, as well as by WTO 
Panel and Appellate Body decisions, it is not adequate to demonstrate 
that measures contrary to general WTO law pursue the objectives stat-
ed in the exceptions. In applying the exceptions, a fine balance should 
be struck between the objectives of environmental protection and trade 
liberalization. Thus, a measure that achieves environmental protection 
goals should not unduly unravel fundamental WTO legal principles, 
notably non-discrimination, non-arbitrariness, and trade liberalization. 
To achieve this delicate balance, a measure for which Article XX excep-
tions are invoked should restrict trade as little as possible and apply 
equally to all WTO Members. 
 Domestic content requirements and export performance condi-
tions fail to strike the balance between environmental protection and 
trade goals, even though they have potential for achieving emissions 
reduction. These conditions are not necessary to achieve emissions re-
duction goals—countries can grant unconditional RES, and these 
would equally serve the goal of mitigating climate change. The condi-
tions are discriminatory and arbitrary, because they protect domestic 
industries and deny market access to importers from other WTO Mem-
bers. To the extent that the conditions are not essential to achieve the 
environmental protection objective, they constitute disguised trade 
measures that serve national economic self-interest more than an inter-
est in global climate change mitigation. 
 The argument against extending the environmental exceptions 
becomes stronger when one considers the general commitment of the 
subsidizing countries to climate change. In particular, Canada, China, 
and India have rejected targeted emissions reduction obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. If all major emitters committed to the Kyoto Proto-
col, the issue of competition would be mitigated and probably result in 
greater compliance with both international trade and climate change 
treaties. Despite the European Union’s (EU) commitment to the Kyoto 
Protocol and to renewable energy, the EU continues to expand its coal 
power generation, which signals a lesser commitment to climate 
change mitigation. Granting environmental exceptions to these coun-
tries will not guarantee that the goals of climate change mitigation will 
be achieved. Thus, the direct link between RES and climate change 
mitigation notwithstanding, the legal case for granting GATT Article 
XX exceptions to conditional RES is at best a weak one. 
 Applying the Article XX exceptions would unravel WTO law with-
out a guarantee that emissions reduction goals will be promoted. 
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Whether a global trading system is preferable or not is a separate issue 
and one left for countries to decide based on their national interest. At 
present, it would be bad law and poor policy to undo a fairly well-
established legal system. At the very least, the system reaffirms collective 
action, which is difficult to achieve at the international level. 
 The implication of not extending Article XX exceptions to condi-
tional RES is that in all likelihood, countries might lose an important 
incentive to grant RES on the taxpayers’ tab, namely addressing compe-
tition and leakage problems associated with climate change mitigation. 
A combination of disparate legal obligations to reduce emissions and a 
liberalized trading system threatens the ability of some nations to re-
duce emissions and yet be competitive. The combination also triggers 
leakage problems. When the option to preclude these problems by ap-
plying trade-restrictive solutions such as conditional RES is removed, so 
is the incentive to provide RES. The issue of competition and leakage 
associated with climate change mitigation efforts cannot be solved un-
der existing international trade law. 
 A better solution would be to negotiate a climate treaty that ad-
dresses trade concerns and that facilitates the application of trade 
measures to promote climate change mitigation efforts. As nations ne-
gotiate a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, they should consider 
not only strategies to reduce emissions, but also strategies to balance 
their trade interests to minimize the negative impact on competition 
and leakage. 
  
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
